Kurdish question can be explained by referring to the transformation of Turkey from a traditional society where the identities were religiously determined at communal level, to a modern society where the aim was to define an individual’s identity at the state level and the driving force behind this nationalism was Turkish nationalism.[1]

The nation has been defined on the bases of three different concepts throughout Turkish history which was “God” under the Ottoman Empire.  In Ottoman society the nationality was on the bases of religion which means that a person’s membership to a religious community was the determining element of nationality. In this sense, many Turks had little or no self awareness. The Ottoman Empire as an authoritarian monarchy with a religious foundation derived from Sultan’s claim that he was also caliph of the world, the spiritual head of the all Muslims of the world so it recognized minorities by defining them in religious terms and gave them extensive self-rule.[2] Both the logic of emperorship and that of Islam exceeded the logic of the nation in Ottoman.

Alongside the newborn nation states, the real inheritor of the Ottoman Empire has become a nation state that is Turkey and under huge efforts for nation building in Turkey, religion  gave its place to ‘nation’ where secularism got the upper hand over God.

In fact the transformation from Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic can be described as a transfer from “Ottoman patriotism” to “Turkish nationalism”. As the Ottoman Empire was disintegrating, the need to build a new order came to agenda. The population of Turkey would need a new identity which would replace the one based on religion and from 1923 onwards  Turkish nationalism came to agenda. This meant a break with the monarchy of the past, with the Islamic character of the state. The founders of the Turkish Republic had the aim of transforming Ottoman Empire to a modern and secular republic and in line with this aim from 1923 an increasing emphasis was given to developing a sense of nationhood based on the Turkish language in contrast to Ottoman Empire where ethnic identities  among the Muslim population had no much significance beyond the cultural and the linguistic.[3]

This notion of nationality continued until the the beginning of 2000s where greater commitment to EU membership opened the way for some political reforms  and increased the hopes for some solution to the Kurdish problem. For countries like Turkey where the real changes can not come from the bottom which is not conscious and enlightened enough to question and bring the change, a catalyser is needed to make people come around a common idea. In Turkish case, The EU acted as a crucial catalyst for some reforms to be brought into life as a civilian power which used carrots as against to sticks. Not the EU itself but the “idea of EU membership” has been the motivator for Turkey’s democratization or the so-called Europeanization process which includes reforms on human rights, plural democracy and minority issue. At the base of these reforms lies the idea to define “human” as the defining element of identity in Turkey which unfortunately was stuck today due to both internal and external dynamics as well as lack of real commitment of governments to the solution of the problem due to their short-visioned electoral concerns.

Shortly, much rests on how successful the governments are in implementing social/ political reforms and opinion makers are in shaping the society’s perception of the issue. Otherwise Turkish hardliners and Kurdish nationalists will come to the scene which means return to the very beginning. In this sense, Turkey by playing the game according to rules of 21^st century, being conscious diplomatic player in international arena instead of taking the role of East’s emotional and courageous rescuer should be very cautious and strong inside. Now is the time for promoting the idea of Turkey’s patriotism where “individual” is valuable just because of his/her existence, neither of religious nor ethnic origins.

Diğdem TÜMTÜRK

[2] Svante E. Cornell , ‘The Kurdish Question in Turkish Politics’, Orbis, 45, 1 (Winter 2001), p.32.

[3] Kirişçi, op.cit., p.280.

Since the end of the 1980s, a conflict emerged berween Azerbaijan and Armenia over the region of Nagorno-Karabakh. In 1992 the conflict culminated into the war between these countries. Cornell (2001), in his book Small nations and great powers: a study of ethnopolitical conflict in the Caucaus, writes how the conflict over this territory turned to be inter-state issue as well as the casualties of the war:

The conflict has led to over twenty thousands casualties and almost one and a half million refugees, a refugee flow which has resulted in a considerable crisis especially in Azerbaijan, with the number of displaced persons numbering close to one million. Over fourteen percent of the territory of Azerbaijan is occupied, territories which have been ethnically cleansed in the course of warfare of their Azeri population by Armenian Forces. The conflict is regarded as an internal conflict by the major powers and international organizations, and the efforts of the international community to bring an end to the conflict have been half-hearted at best and exiguous at worst. The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh clearly possesses an intra-state dimension, that of the struggle for independence on the part of the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh. However, since the beginning of 1992 the conflict also possesses an inter-state dimension in the sense that it involved two sovereign states as belligerents: Armenia and Azerbaijan… p. 31. … By early 1992, the power vacuum created by the dissolution of the Soviet Union led to the loss of the last factor containing the conflict. Thus with the imminent withdrawal of the formerly Soviet forces, Karabakh became the scene of what gradually increased to a full-scale war. The Armenian side, having prepared itself to solve the conflict through military means, did not loose any time to act. p. 61[i]

As stated above, the war outbroke just after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In fact, following the Glasnost and Perestroika policies of Gorbachev, the Soviet Union had already lost almost all its influences on its member republics. Most important fact is that people of this gigantic union themselves believed in the demise of the Soviet Union and its influence. Especially, people of Azerbaijan, after the January Massacre, done by the Red Army of the Soviet Union during the dissolution period, were among the strong believers to this demise. In these circumstances, nationalist movements became dominant in all post soviet republics. On the other hand, according to Abrahamian (1998), there always been nationalism in the Soviet Union in the form of “linguistic nationalism”, caused by the imposition of the Russian language to all Soviet republics instead of the mother tongue of each republic[ii]. Therefore, after dissolution of the Soviet Union, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict became a war between ‘Armenians’ and ‘Azerbaijanis’, or ‘Hays’ and ‘Turks’, according to Armenian nationalists of this period. Khojaly Massacre ‘performed’ by the Armenian army was the breaking point of the war making these two nations to turn to be enemies for several decades, as history approves. On the official website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan (mfa.gov.az) the settlement process of the conflict presented by the UN and OSCE is described below:

In general, the legal and political constituent for the settlement of the conflict is based on the norms and principles of international law, laid down in UN Security Council resolutions 822, 853, 874 and 884 as well as in the appropriate documents and decisions of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and other international organizations. As mentioned above, the UN Security Council resolutions were adopted in 1993 in response to the occupation of the territories of Azerbaijan and reaffirmed respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of the international borders of the Republic of Azerbaijan and all other States in the region. The Council demanded immediate cessation of all hostile acts, immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of occupying forces from all occupied regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan, and called for the restoration of economic, transport and energy links in the region, ensuring the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes. n. pag.[iii]

Until today, the settlement of the conflict is very (if not the most) significant issue in both domestic realm and the foreign policies of both countries. In this article, public opinion in Azerbaijan on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and its effects on Azerbaijan’s foreign policy will be briefly analyzed.

PUBLIC OPINION IN AZERBAIJAN ON NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT, IT’S IMPACT ON FOREIGN POLICY, AND OPINION-POLICY CONNECTION ON THE CONFLICT

1. 1. Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict as ‘Bread and Butter’ Issue in Domestic Realm

After the January Massacre, and the following declaration of independence followed by dropping the term ‘Soviet Republic’ from its name, Azerbaijan entered into the most difficult phase of its history, where social, economic and political upheavals waited for it.

Firstly, Karabakh War detoriorated the social life in all aspects and throughout the whole country. In addition to dead bodies of soldiers ‘went’ to all cities and villages, the people(now, refugees) displaced from their motherland, Dağlıq(Nagorny) Karabakh, flowed to all regions, especially to big cities of Azerbaijan. According to the report of Chloe Arnold (2002), Baku-based BBC correspondent, until the ceasefire established in 1994, ”an estimated 17,000 people had been killed, another 50,000 had been wounded, and 1.2 million had been forced from their homes. Today, many of the 100,000 Azeris who fled their villages in Nagorno-Karabakh are still living in abandoned railway cars, mud-brick houses, and tents”. Considering the size of population in Azerbaijan which approximately was 7 million(The State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan), it is obvious that the number of refugees which was over 1 million created deep social concerns in Azerbaijan. The refugees could not adapt to the ‘new life’ in another lands, and local people did not get well along refugees because they had to share already scarce resources with newcomers. For this and many another reasons, people felt such bitter consequences of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict on everywhere in daily life.

Moreover, economic life was as collapsed as demographic situation. Economy had already been collapsed as a result of the Soviet dissolution. According to the World Bank report (2002), “Most of the formerly Soviet states began the transition to a market economy in 1990-1991 and made efforts to rebuild and restructure their economic systems, with varying results. The process triggered a severe transition decline, with Gross Domestic Product (GDP) dropping by more than 40% between 1990 and 1995”[iv]. In addition to this, the unexpected and huge migration caused by Nagorno-Karabakh War paralyzed the already deteriorated economy. Inflation and unemployment were at the top of the problems and the public opinion on this issue was formed in a way that all the guilt for the current situation was seen on the Karabakh War, and its initiator-Armenia.

Furthermore, political situation in Azerbaijan was negatively affected by the Nagorno-Karabakh War. Ayaz Mutallibov, the head of the state since September 8, 1991, resigned from his post on March 6, 1992, under the pressure of Azerbaijan Popular Front (leader of which was Elçibey) due to failure in defending Khojaly and giving an opportunity to Armenian army to realize a genocide in Khojaly. The national presidential elections were held on June 7, 1992, and Elçibey was elected the President of Azerbaijan Republic by gaining over 50% of votes.[v] The same issue of Karabakh War made Elçibey also to resign from presidency, and apart from Karabakh issue, there was a threat of civil war in the country. It was not until 1996 the stability and order was established in Azerbaijan under the presidency of Haydar Aliyev. Political landscape, however, were the same throughout this period. Settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict were the first priority of these three governments although Mutallibov was communist while Elçibey and Aliyev rejected communism.

1. 2. Weight of Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict in Azerbaijan’s Foreign Policy

Generally, since the independence of Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh issue and its settlement have always been among the top priorities of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy. In their speeches, Azerbaijani officials, including president and foreign minister, always claimed about the opportunities that both Armenia and Azerbaijan could benefit if the conflict resolved within the frames of the integrity of Azerbaijani territories, that is, after Armenia’s withdrawal of its army from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. Elmar Mammadyarov, Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan, in his article published on Wall Street Journal (2008), once again emphasized the importance of the settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict not only for the parties of conflict but also for the region:

The current market price for oil and gas is high and we should be able to maximize the economic potential of our strategic resources. The unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, however, threatens the security of the existing pipeline infrastructure, preventing us from optimizing the region’s energy trade with Europe. For us in Azerbaijan this will impede economic growth, which has been averaging around 30% in the past few years. n. pag.[vi]

Above, in the excerpt, again it can be seen that official Azerbaijan wants to return its territorries at any cost and without any compromise. This is the real proof of the huge impact of public opinion on the foreign policy.

The question emerges: How it is possible for public opinion to have such huge links with  foreign policy on this issue?

1. 3. A Multiaxial Evaluation of the link between Foreign Policy and Public Opinion on Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

Nagorno-Karabakh issue, in general, is one of the issues which are difficult to be categorized as an issue solely belonging to domestic or foreign policies. It is for this reason that opinion-policy linkage on Karabakh issue is so huge and ‘fresh’. Therefore, it would be mistake to comment this issue without considering the socio-economic and political factors affecting this links. Based on ‘a Multiaxial Assessment of Policy Climate in Mediating Opinion-Policy Connections’ proposed by Shiraev and Sobel (2003), the link between opinion and policy can be analyzed by several dimensions and axes. There are two dimensions affecting the opinion-policy linkage. First one is ‘basic socio-economic and political factors’ which include two axes, namely, ‘political institutions and communications’ and ‘political landscape’. Second dimension is ‘basic cultural and psychological factors’, again which includes two axes, namely, ‘general socio-cultural variables’ and ’contextual and situational factors’[vii]. In order to clarify the affect of these dimensions and axes on opinion-policy linkage in Nagorno-Karabakh issue, on the Graph 1 the case is shown graphically.

Graph 1 – Analysis of impact of  several factors on foreign policy-public opinion connection on the issue of Nagorno Karabakh conflict

CONCLUSION

Considering the historical, political, social and economic factors on Nagorno-Karabakh issue and the policy-opinion connection on this issue, the following conclusions can be drawn.

First, the history made this conflict escalate into the war in which hundred thousands were killed and over a million people were internally displaced. Second, political life during the early independence period was full of upheavals and instability; however, the political atmosphere on the Karabakh issue has always remained unchanged. This is mainly because of the fact the public opinion has remained unchanged on the issue. Third, socio-economic factors were very effective in the process of opinion forming. The war was considered to be the father of all social and economic upheavals in the country. Fourth, the attention was drawn to the fact that on issues like Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, where it is not possible to categorize the issue solely as domestic or foreign, opinion-policy linkage is very huge because public opinion has great impact on foreign policy.

Cemil Islamov

[ii] Abrahamian, L. (1998, 08 01). Mother Tongue: Linguistic Nationalism and the Cult of Translation in Postcommunist Armenia. Berkeley, USA. Retrieved from http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/9cm4d9vn

[iii] Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (tarih yok). Republic of Azerbaijan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved on June 12, 2010, from http://www.mfa.gov.az/eng/khojaly_en/index.php

[iv] The World Bank. (2002). Transition: The First Ten Years – Analysis and Lessons For Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. Washington. DC.

[v] Academic dictionaries and encyclopedias.http://en.academic.ru/dic.nsf/enwiki/42307

[vi] Mammadyarov, E. (2008). The Caspian Moment. Wall Street Journal , 4.

[vii] Sobel, R., & Shiraev, E. (2003). International Public Opinion and the Bosnia Crisis. Lanham: Lexington  Books.

RADİCALISM AND DEMOCRACY

While supporting Islamic movements against communism, USA also laid the foundations of its future plans and also it blackened the future of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Especially, with the outbreak of ‘unsuccessfulness’ in Afghanistan and with the increase in American antagonism, radical and extremist Islamic parties started to gain power in Pakistan. While being supported by only a small portion of people until 2002, the conditions challenged for Islamic parties with the invasion of Afghanistan by USA.3 Especially in some places, which are close to Afghanistan borders of Pakistan, sympathy for Taliban increased enormously in many places in Pakistan. During the first stages of the invasion USA and Pakistan President P.Musharraf, who took the power with a coup in 1999 were collaborating. Moreover in 24 June 2003, President W.Bush thanked to Musharraf because of his support to reconstruction of Afghanistan and his decisive posture! 4 But after a short time, when Pakistan was seen as a responsible from the worsening conditions in Afghanistan and growing of Islamism, world public turned to Pakistan as a failing state.
Pakistan was an important country that must not fall into the hands of Islamic terrorists. It was not only a center state for intervention in Afghanistan but also it was the only Islamic state that has nuclear weapons. It would be a disaster if Pakistan administration would be captured by Islamists and this would result in emergence of new Irans, new North Koreas. Finally, an unsuccessful assassination attempt to Musharraf in 2003 alarmed the US administration and by initiating the period of transition to democracy in Pakistan, USA tried to find alternative political parties against the Islamic ones. At this point Benazir Bhutto, who was recognized as a secular person and became Prime Minister two times, was the first name that was coming to mind. Appearance of Bhutto, who was in exile, was seen as an enemy project by Al Qaeda and Taliban. In addition to this when Bhutto explained that she wants to act more brutally to Islamists than Musharraf did, this speech made her an open target for the Islamists.
In 5 October 2007, when President Musharraf signed the law of Defraudation Forgiveness, Bhutto eluded from the allegations, which were made during her times of Prime Ministry and anymore there was not any obstacles that would prevent her to come her country again. When she returned to her country in 18 October 2007, a big crowded met her in Karachi Harbor. This return’s mean was alternation of Pakistan society to a democratic one5 and this was starting point of the end for Bhutto. During the meeting ceremony, the first “welcome gift” was given to Bhutto with a suicide attack, in which almost 150 people died. This attack was the messenger of the next ones. Bhutto, who was rescued from first attack in Karachi, was not as lucky as before when the second attack was made. In 27 November 2007, while she was telling her election works to people, she died because of an assassination and she shared the same end with her father Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, was also hanged by Ziya-ul Hak in 1977. After her death one of Al Qaeda’s leaders in Afghanistan declared that “they destroyed the most important American capital, who pledged to beat the Mujahids”.6 Some people can reject it but Bhutto was an important “American capital”. It is clear that her return to Pakistan was provided by USA.

AFTER BHUTTO

Death of Bhutto finished the American dream of democratization of Pakistan for a while. Musharraf, who was blamed for not providing the security of Bhutto effectively, abandoned his position in the General Staff. The political environment after assassination of Bhutto caused the decrease in support to Islamist parties as it is seen in election results, too. Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party and another opposing party Pakistan Muslim Union-Navaz raised their votes. On the other hand Islamist parties lost support. Another dimension of elections is that it revealed some results that can directly affect the political career of Musharraf. The straw polls showed that people’s support to Musharraf was decreasing. I think the opposing parties are also insufficient to fulfill the people’s wants. These show that Pakistan is deprived from leaders, who can ameliorate the living conditions of Pakistani people and provide economic stability to Pakistan. I mean that in Pakistan “politics for persons” understanding is seen more important that the understanding of “politics for Pakistani people”.7

JUDGEMENT

With the increasing usage of term, globalization, all states are face to face with the danger of separation to ethnic and religious minor groups. While globalization is devastating the nation-states, societies are drifting apart their ethnic roots.8 Especially, states that are composed of more than one national identities such as Pakistan are losing their chance of living together. The American led imperialist powers are applying cruel policies to states, which are made up of many ethnicities. Pakistan also got its share from this. The eminent map, which was published by American Armed Forces Journal, clearly shows that USA does not want to see Pakistan as it is today.9
Combating with terrorism, political-economic problems and social disagreements are taking away Pakistan to a critical chaos. Since they prioritize to religious identities, Pakistani people don’t see the ascendant of radicalism as a problem. On the contrary, some reactions that made against shariah demands in some parts of the country are less than the reactions that are made against American invasion. The armament because of the disputes between Pakistan and neighbor states and as a result decline in economic welfare level, the importance of religion in Pakistan history, different pursuits of people because of economic backwardness, the importance of religion in education and the changing international balance are the reasons that help us to understand the radicalism in Pakistan.10 Finally; when we look to the structure in Pakistan society, we see that the threat perception of international public is not same with the perception of Pakistani people. While international community sees terrorism and radicalism as the most important problems in Pakistan, it should not be forgotten that for an ordinary Pakistani citizen economic and social problems come first.
Maybe it is more useful and beneficial for international actors, especially for USA, not to intervene internal affairs in Pakistan, not to direct the country for their own purposes and interest and to give a chance to Pakistan to solve the problems under the light of its own dynamics and priorities. It is not a good approach to try to understand Islamabad by looking from Washington!

Nail ELHAN

For the Turkish of the essay, please click here

REFERENCES

1 Cavid Veliev, “Pakistan’da Sivil Siyasetin Sonu”, Cumhuriyet Strateji Sayı:184, Ankara s.12

2 Uluslararası İlişkiler ve Siyaset Teorisi Üzerine Derleme

3 Gökçen Oğan, “Pakistan’da Seçimler Belirsizliği Artırdı”, Stratejik Analiz, No.95, Ankara, s.8-9

4 Mustafa Kemal Dağdelen, “Kaosun Odağı Pakistan”, Stratejik Analiz, No.110, Ankara, s.68

5 Cavid Veliev, “Pakistan’da Sivil Siyasetin Sonu”, Cumhuriyet Strateji Sayı:184, Ankara s.13

6 Prof.M.Shadid Alam, “Bir Pakistan Trajedisi”, http://www.makaleler.com/oku-bir+pakistan+trajedisi

7 Gökçen Oğan, “Pakistan’da Koalisyon Sallanıyor”, Stratejik Analiz, No.98, Ankara, s.15

8 Anıl Çeçen, Türkiye ve Avrasya, Ankara, Fark Yayınları, 2006, s.73

9 Ali Külebi, “Pakistan’a Ağır Bedel”, Cumhuriyet Strateji Sayı:225, Ankara s.9

10 Mustafa Kemal Dağdelen, “Kaosun Odağı Pakistan”, Stratejik Analiz, No.110, Ankara, s.71

One of the most important policy fields in the EU is regional policy whose effective implementation depends on the compatibility of local and regional governance systems of member states with EU practice and regulatory norms. In line with the European Regional Policy, the potential member states pass through a transformation process where EU accession enacts as catalyst to the policy enhancement in terms of European Regional Policy standards. However, this period of policy transformation in candidate countries are not free of challenges. In that respect, Turkey constitutes a special case study in terms of its still ongoing adaptation process with EU regional policy regulations and norms. Turkey is a country with huge interregional disparities which has passed through a fast structural and policy changes in an unstable macroeconomic environment over a long period of time. Throughout this transformation period Turkey made remarkable attempts to develop a regional policy. Firstly, the transformation from a plan-driven import-substitution to an open export-based economy was realized in 1980 and further steps were taken to develop a fully market economy. The eventual admission of Turkey’s candidate status in the Helsinki European Council (1999) accelerated Turkey’s efforts in the way of harmonizing its policies with the acquis. From that time onwards, the policy transformation period posed some challenges to Turkey as other candidate countries.

In order to make a detailed examination of those challenges and Turkey’s actions as against to those challenges, it would be useful to make a comparative analysis of this transformation between a recently acceded country to the EU namely, ‘Poland’ and Turkey who had experienced similar challenges while adopting their regional policies to EU standards. Similarity in territorial length, average population and share of rural population in the total, sharp east-west division in terms of socio-economic development, levels of unemployment rates may be given as reasons laying behind our choice to study on Poland.

Moreover Polish experience of post-communist transition in early 1990s and Turkey’s transformation from a centrally planned economy to a more liberal in 1980s; the fact that both countries are characterized with huge disparities between West-East and Rural-Urban regions; centralization being an important hurdle in the way of implementing its regional policy in the pre-accession policy in both countries; and the dominant position of sectoral policies over regional policies for long years again both in Turkey and Poland, constitutes another dimension which makes Poland and Turkey as suitable units for a comparative analysis.

PROBLEMS IN THE POLICY TRANSFORMATION IN TURKEY& POLAND: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

1. Regional Unevenness

It is usually argued that Turkey is characterized with huge internal disparities which means that Turkey’s accession to the EU would increase the already existing regional disparities within the EU. The western/eastern divide of Turkey in economical terms constitutes a significant hurdle on the way of Turkey’s policy transformation in line with EU conditionality. Despite Turkish economy’s long-term growth, the even development across the country could not be observed. Besides regional disparities, provincial disparities in the country are also unbearable. The disparities between the East and the West of Turkey can be related to the characteristics of the local politics executed in those regions besides the economic and social factors. The local politicians  in the West are approaching local problems and demands from a national-level perspective in that sense they put a great importance to their relations with Ankara in the way of achieving local political objectives. On the other hand, in the eastern part of the country due to the low-income and agriculture-based economy, the voters are highly involved in local politics and reflect their regional identity by this way.[i]

For Polish case, we can say that Poland faces serious problems of uneven regional development which constituted a hurdle in its progress to EU as well. Due to its historical heritage, Poland is still suffering from a division between the better developed western part and the lower developed eastern part division.[ii] Similar to Turkey, the eastern part of the country was portrayed as peripheral region by the regional planners in Poland and the post-communist systemic transformation of the national economy pointed out the weakness of the regional structure in the country which was shaped under central planning.[iii] The changes in industrial and agricultural production, the process of privatization and the spatial adaptation have not been uniformly intensive throughout the country on the basis of which lies the regional diversity, levels of wealth, dependence on production conditions and the level of social development.[iv] As a result, this transformation led to a polarized regional development with two groups of winner and looser regions between 1990-94 period.[v] The 1999 reform of country’s territorial organization has not greatly affected this spatial polarization of the country and this polarization continued to be a hurdle on the way of Poland’s regional policy harmonization with EU as it was the case in Turkey. The urban-rural tension continues to have an impact on the regional policy development of Poland. This division affected the direction of investments as well. Since the rural regions were in trouble surrounded with a weak infrastructure, poor privatization and fragmented agriculture were not attractive for the investors; they were directed towards the urban areas associated with well-developed infrastructure, strong privatization prospects and cheap labor.[vi] This regional unevenness in Polish case is quite similar to Turkish case in the sense that in both countries rural areas are highly differentiated in terms of their preparedness for EU accession, with the regions in the western part of the country in a much better position to overcome the EU membership than those in the East.

The regional disparities in both countries together with the general shift in the EU regional policy away from “equalization and solidarity” to “efficiency and competitiveness” led to concerns on the ability of the eastern regions  to meet the challenges in formulating and implementing the regional policy especially their scarce resources are taken into account which will deepen the regional disparities.

2. From Centralization to Decentralization: A Difficult Progress

In order to understand the complexity and uniqueness of the regionalization process in Turkey, it’s necessary to examine the regional structure in Turkey.  The unitary state in Turkey does not have a legal definition of “region”.[vii] Within the framework of the provincial system the main relations are centered on two actors, namely center and province. This is a quite centralized system in the sense that the center determines the performance of the provisions through financial and political measures.  What’ more the reforms realized in the way of accessing to EU did not change the top-to-bottom approach in regional policy implementation. The regionalization attempts by State Planning Organization and State Institute of Statistics were realized without collaborating with the regions and without giving them sufficient decision-making power and economic resources. This centralized nature of the governance led to a belief that “the centre knows the best”[viii] and this kind of an approach prevails the political culture of Ministries and SPO as well. This understanding in Turkey can be related to the absence of both capitalistic class and industrial heritage from the very beginning of the Republic which led to a state-led economy even after 1980s when the shift to economic liberalization was the case and this state-dependency diminished the importance of regional and local politics has to a great extent in Turkey.[ix]

As mentioned before this centralization is an Ottoman legacy consolidated by the nationalist government of the new Republic of Turkey. Recent years witnessed a transformation of this method of governance due to some external and internal pressures like the motivation to harmonize with EU for accession. In line with this transformation the constitution was amended several times with the aim of reexamining the administrative structures in the country. However, at the end of the day the public administration remained still highly-centralized since the laws don’t emphasize on local democracy and decentralization of power. What’ more the bureaucrats did not perceive the regional planning as a necessary function and since 1960, sectoral logic dominated the regional one and the national plannings were prepared in line. Although some proposals were made by the SPO to establish regional representations, the desire to implement those proposals was quite limited. One of the factors at the basis of the regionalization failures is problematic nature of the institutional structure at the central level. The horizontal coordination between the sectoral Ministries and SPO in regional planning could not be realized due to status questions of SPO vis-à-vis the Ministries.

Turkey’s centralized governance system constitutes a big challenge in Turkey’s harmonization of its regional policy with EU norms and regulations since it’s nor compatible with the multi-level governance at EU level. The absence of an intermediary institutional structure between the center and local made it difficult for Turkey to bring its regional policy to EU standards in the pre-accession periods.[x]

For Poland the centralization has been an important hurdle in the way of implementing its regional policy in the pre-accession policy although not as severe as in Turkey. As already mentioned before, the biggest weakness of Polish regional policy stemmed from centralization which was a legacy of Communist era. Within this system regions run from Warsaw and had no institutional capacity for self-managed development.[xi] After long years of a centralized system the 1999 reform delivered a decentralizing promise of equipping the country with administrative structure that would facilitate the EU entry. However, even after this transformation the Poland’s EU pre-accession programmes were largely managed within one central organizational framework which resulted in a big coordination problem. During the pre-accession period the funds were not coordinated as support instruments for regional development, meaning that they operated separately without any multiplier effect.[xii]

3. Priority of Sectoral Policy over Regional Policy

Despite the steps taken to establish new structures at regional level, the absence of a real agency or ministry for regional policy at national level led to SPO assuming the full competence on this area in Turkey and for nearly 40 years or more the SPO has been preparing five-year development plans on sectoral basis So in addition to the centrality we must add the sectoral understanding to define traditional planning method in Turkey. Within this approach, the plans were made to promote the development of certain sectors without considering the regional dimensions. Thus the incentives were directed to the businesses that will enable sectoral growth rather than development of needy regions. As an example to this understanding we can give the national development plans focusing largely economic measures and city plans at the local level without tackling the regional disparities.[xiii]

The same problem reveals itself while examining the Polish case. The National Development Programmes in Poland were composed of a complex set of priorities and initiatives. The so-called coordination problem in the implementation of those programmes led to implementation of regional initiatives and this predominance of the sectoral policy over regional policy led to the imbalanced regional development. This problem is related with one of the important principle governing the EU regional policy, the so-called ‘concentration’ principle. In line with this principle the candidate countries should concentrate the funds on most needy regions instead of directing it to sectors with a growth potential. However, in Turkey the resources most of the time were oriented to national industrialization rather than to the reduction of regional disparities. Even giving 35 provinces the status of Priority Development Areas in 1993 did not the direction of resources from industrialized provinces to underdeveloped ones. While these provinces received 15.7 percent of public investment in 1991, 12.4 percent in 1992 and 17.8 percent in 1993, provinces in Marmara and Aegean regions attracted more than 50 percent of the public investment.[xiv] The same concentration problem is relevant for Poland in its pre-accession period during which the workforce and finance were concentrated mainly in the largest Polish cities as it was the case in Turkey.

CONCLUSION

The comparative analysis above addresses the problematic dimensions of regional policy implementation in Turkey and led us to make concrete conclusions on the way recording a successful score for Turkey’s harmonization with acquis. First of all, in the pre-planning stage, regional analysis shall be realized from a broader perspective including the sharing of responsibilities among relevant ministries, regional agents and civil society organizations, meaning a shift from a centralized approach to a decentralized one. Moreover, the problems within the bureaucracy have to be solved for efficient regional governance as well. Although the EU conditionality has been a strong driving force for Turkey’s alteration of its regional governance, there are still counter forces within the bureaucracy acting against change.[xv]

Turkey has to take lessons from the experiences of existing EU countries to revise its regional policies and in order to increase the pace of its adaptation process with the acquis. In line with this revision the first step shall be to share and reorganize this responsibility. Also the regions shall firstly rely on their internal power instead of state dependency. The establishment of regional self-governments to implement regional policy is another lesson to be taken for Turkey in this pre-accession period. These regional self-governments are crucial in the sense that they will be able to make independent investment decisions to support economic activity and to establish cooperation between different institutions.[xvi] Most importantly, an accelerated and healthy period of policy transformation needs a qualitative change instead of quantitative financial transfers which means a radical change in the values, institutional structures and communication.

Diğdem Tümtürk

[ii]Poznan (Wielkopolskie), Wroclaw (Dolnoslaskie), Gdansk (Pomorskie) and Krakow (Malopolskie) and Warszawa (Mazowickie)[ii] are those limited number of prosperous regions which are located in the western and southern parts and backed by strong economic, cultural, scientific and academic centres and attracting high levels of investment hence creating lots of job opportunities, and boosting their economies. Please see Annex for detail information.

[iii] Miroslawa Czerny, Andrzej Czerny, “The Challenge of Spatial Reorganization in A Peripheral Polish Region”, European Urban and Regional Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1, (2002) p.60.

[iv] Justyna Weltrowska, “Economic Change and Social Polarization in Poland”, European Urban and Regional Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1, (2002) p. 49.

[v] The winning regions with a developed services and technical infrastructure, skilled kabor forces, a scientific and technological base before 1999 consists of Warsaw, Poznan, Cracow, Wroclaw, Gdansk, Szczecin, Bydgoszcz and Bielsko- Biala. The loosers are the old industrial regions (Lodz, Katowice, Walbrzych, Jelenia Gora, Legnica, Konin and Tarnobrzeg); recession regions (Koszalin, Slupsk, Olsztyn, Suwalki, Tırun, Wloclawek, Plock and Ciechanow); poorly developed regions ( Ostroleka, Lomza, Bialystok, Biala Podlaska, Siedlce, Chelm, and Zamosc)

[vi] Blazyca, Heffner and  Huhes, op.cit., p.265.

[vii] There are different examples for different conceptualizations of the term ‘region’ in Turkey. First of all, the country is divided into seven regions considering the climatic and topography conditions. Moreover the regional development projects initiated by the SPO like  Eastern Black Sea Regional Development Plan (DOKAP), Zonguldak-Bartin-Karabuk Regional Development Project used the term ‘region’ on a project basis.The South-eastern Anatolia Project (GAP) has a distinctive regional development administration regulated by a specific legislation. Another conceptualization of ‘region’  is about the Emergency State Region (OHAL) which was established in the South-eastern Anatolia to fight against terrorism.

[viii] Ebru Loewendahl-Ertugal, “Europeanization of Regional Policy and Regional Governance: The Case of Turkey”, European Political Economy Review, Vol. 3, No. 1, (Spring 2005) p.34.

[ix] Dulupçu, op.cit., pp. 105,106.

[x] Only exception to this is the South-eastern Anatolian Development Project (GAP) administration.

[xi] Miroslawa Czerny, “Uneven Urban and Regional Development in Poland”, European Urban and Regional Studies Vol.9, No. 1, (2002) p. 37.

[xii] Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse, “An Evaluation of the Regional Policy System in Poland: Challenges and Threats Emerging From Participation in the EU’s Cohesion Policy, European Urban and Regional Studies, Vol. 13, No. 2, (2006) p. 153.

[xiii] Loewendahl-Ertugal, op.cit., p.29.

[xiv] Ibid., pp.27,28.

[xv] Loewendahl-Ertugal, op.cit., p. 45.

[xvi] Grosse, op.cit., p.152.

We didn’t know that the Middle East, which is in fact, too close to us, is far and the place called the Far East is far away to us.

The colonialist West mentality-West doesn’t express a geographical meaning here-, began to decide the name of the places since it got the region, called East, under its thumb. We didn’t know that our southern neighbors were placing at the middle of the East or Cyprus was in somewhere that was near to Europe. It seems like that a line had been drawn beyond Greece; the left side is western, modern and civilized. The rest? Go to the Hell! Eastern, dirty, wild, uncivilized and Muslims.

The “Apartheid” is made for once: “We” and “they”.

East is always thought in terms of the necessities of Europe. After once The West chose the East as the target point, it created new concepts and new ideas: East and Eastern, Arab, Muslim, Indian, Chinese, terrorist and many others. All these had been refreshed in every era and while sometimes Jesus was being used as the supporter of West and Europe concepts, then concepts of human rights and democracy were emphasized by Westerns. Did people were killed, where? In United States, sir. The individual is the most magnanimous creature and in 21st century, human violations should be prevented. What about the events in Iraq, in Afghanistan and in Palestine? They are not human. Because they don’t understand anything from democracy and modernism. But, sir! They are living on the oil, what will happen? Yes, they don’t know these concepts, but somebody should teach to them!

You know after what happened: One million people have died in Iraq; civilians were killed in Afghanistan “accidentally”. It’s ok, no problem. According to Westerns, these people died for the sake of democracy.

This is the Western mind… Poor Democracy Martyrs!

The western man, who scorns us: According to us this is a duty for humanity. We don’t want deaths of children and we don’t want discrimination of women. Everybody should be able to use their basic human rights. Human rights are universal…then a smile comes…but they are for the humans. In other words for those, who we think as humans. The rest is only a pretext. Democracy is a pretext. Civilization is a pretext. The magnificent thing is imperialism. What is magnificent is the money that comes from the oil. What is the magnificent is the maintenance of the West hegemony. What understands the man, who sits in London, in New York, in Paris, in a Starbucks Café and drinks his coffee while reading his newspaper, from the conditions of a woman that lives in Camp of Satilla in poverty, of a human whose home is collapsed by Israel in Gaza or of a man who lost his child in civil war in Iraq.

The idea that is based on the imaginary geographies such as “our country” and “their country” doesn’t need the latter to believe this difference. What is important is creation of this difference in the side, which uses the word of “us”. After this difference is created once, the other side takes the name of “they” with all its lands, languages and thoughts and the other side becomes alienated to “us”.

We are Easters. The role, which is given to us, is this.

Vive la petrol!
Vive la democracy!
Vive la civilization!

Nail ELHAN

Today, roughly half of the population is female. Despite this mass and much of the world economy driven by women, they have just 10% of the world’s income. The gender gap became clearer especially after World Economic Forum 2010 released its worldwide report results. According to Global Gender Gap Index, Iceland is the country where there is the smallest gender gap and Yemen is the biggest. While US is the 31st, Turkey is the 129th out of 134 country (Switzerland, 2010).

To begin with, gender equality is a really complex phenomenon; therefore what exactly ‘equality’ means needs to be answered .It does not necessarily mean always fifty-fifty, rather it is giving the right to women to do whatever they want:work outside home, study at school or even stay at home. What is indispensable is civil justice that guarantees woman rights. Respected and protected rights, economical and political participation, sanitation, education and being free from violence bring along woman emancipation. Unfortunately, one of the major problems that women get face to face is usually lack of opportunity to fulfill their objectives. Statistics about women participation in business is important; because it gives us whether they are given the same opportunity to participate in as much as men or not. Majority of female population wants to be involved in business arena, if they are endowed. However, according to the some, attempts to achieve equality between men and women often result in tokenism, which means a symbolic gesture.

Does equality means women at work or just fundamental respect for woman in the society? The answer is both of them. It is essential to change the way people behave against women especially in their basic units of society, which is in fact home. By dealing with literacy and neglect, it is achievable to reach respect for women. Educated women have more chance to be a part of the economic life; because, economic sufficiency brings in dignity in the society. Those women who are capable of affording their needs are less inclined to be under pressure on their own situations and political decisions. Therefore, respect for women in the society and economic, political participation go hand-in-hand.

Since women are replete with different talents and capabilities, unemployed women are waste of talents. Whether you see women as potential consumers or potential talent pool, you need to see them as a work pool in the end. They needs to be brought to the market, which is an economic imperative. It is another question that whether women behave in a more responsible or a less risky way. It is a natural faith that women are better to put themselves in their customers’ shoes and their employers’ shoes. Furthermore; greater balance, greater representation of experiences and differences of talents lead to better production in the end, actually it is what we should strive for.

British businesswoman Nichola Pease recently told a UK parliamentary committee that some employers believe hiring women is ‘a nightmare’ because of maternity leave and fears of discrimination action. It is true that maternity leave is a burden for small entrepreneurs, but the cost is relatively less for the big ones. When we think about 30 years of business life and approximately one or two children per woman, two or three months of maternity leave should not be a concern of any employers. It is necessary to consider about woman’s contribution to the business first. And also, in the changing world,paternity leave is also encountered any more .

Melike BAŞTÜRK

China is being accused of keeping its currency undervalued in order to boost exports. US legislators and trade groups say the yuan is kept up to 40% below what its value should be against dollar. US President Barack Obama urged China to adopt a ‘more market-oriented exchange rate’, a day after that a deputy governor of the Chinese Central Bank said that US should not politicise Chinese currency policy. When we look at this issue from Chinese perspective,  US and EU force China to solve their own problem, which is not acceptable for them.However, EU does think adversely. According to them the global economy should be dealt with all together. Romano Prodi, former president of the European Commission said, China is in front of a choice whether to be a giant alone or to grow co-operatively. He also warns that all the countries that try to grow alone in a global world is bound to fail.

The yuan was tied to dollar until 2005 when it was allowed to rise in value by 20%. The peg was reinstated in 2008 when the global economic crisis at demand for Chinese products and factories began closing. China PM Wen pronounces himself as a staunch supporter of free trade warning against protectionism and currency devaluations to boost exports as harmful to economic recovery. He says keeping yuan stable was an important contribution to global recovery from the economic downturn. He claims that yuan, or renminbi, is not undervalued; not in that even as global trade plummeted last year, US and EU exports to China shrank at lower rate. With more than 800 billion of dollars its foreign exchange reserves invested in US Treasury Securities Wen says the value of the US dollar was a big concern and asked to take unspecified steps to reassure investors.

However, some experts argue that markets are overestimating the potential impact of an appreciation of Chinese renminbi aganist the US dollar on other currencies. Riaefcke from Commerzbank states that fears of reduction in China’s trade surplus with the US due to falling exports are not borne out by history.Between 2005-2009 when the trade-weighted renminbi appreciated notably, China’s surplus rose immediately. The direct effects of renminbi appreciation are not to be discernible. Only secondary effects which will be mainly of market psychological nature will have some limited effects on the G10 currencies.

If China did not start to appreciate the renminbi over a few weeks, economist Stephen Green urges that there would be a good chance for the US to label China as a currency manipulator. That could pave the way for the US to levy new duties on Chinese products. The respond coming from China will set the agenda for the global trade and exchange markets.

US is the strongest economy of the world now and China seems to be the one in the future.1890-1910 period was the time for US to boost as a super power. The time is ticking for China now, but the efforts of China to sustain its military capability and statistics about its developments make it dependant on US support, unfortunately. Any idea  about  a boycott on China  from US will have hazardous impacts on China; because of this China is behaving in a way that the relation between them will not be damaged. Everybody and of course China also know that one swallow does not make a summer. The recorded economical developments does not mean everything, unless it is handled very carefully to maintain it.

Melike BAŞTÜRK

In 2002, Alireza Jaferzadeh from Iran National Resistance Movement brought out the secret nuclear efforts of Iran and this condition carried the USA-Iran relations that were really high-strung ever since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 to a new and imbroglio situation. After 1979-Islamic Revolution, as a result of national pride and anti-Americanism, the American Embassy in Tehran was raided by Iranian students and 66 American people was taken as hostage. This event passed into history as Hostage Crisis. 444 days lasting action gained a new extent after the unsuccessful rescue operation of US Special Forces in 1980 and by affecting the presidential elections in USA caused the triumph of Reagan against Carter.

Accused by USA from building “axis of evil”, in 1957 Iran began its nuclear “cruising” with the support of USA as irony of fate. It took the first step by signing the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement during Shah Era. In following years, USA provided light water reactor and laboratory materials for Iran to be used in Tehran Nuclear Research Center. As 1980-1988 Iraq-Iran War mitigated the Iran’s efforts in its nuclear energy program and harmed the development of nuclear energy, interests of Iran in nuclear maintained by the supports of states such as Russia, China and Pakistan. However; the emergence of secret missions of Iran, it drew all attention towards itself.

Why Iran wants to be a nuclear weapon producing power and why USA is against it? When we look from the Iranian side, although there are several political groups from various political spectrums, a consensus appears in nuclear energy issue. Iran approaches the nuclear energy as its long term strategy and as a security requirement. Being a contained state by Sunni-Arab neighboring states and “archenemy” Israel discomposes Iran, which is both Shiah and Persian. With the impact of anti-Americanism, Iranian government and majority of Iranian people think that if Iran has nuclear weapon, no state can assault to it. Moreover, having nuclear will give superiority Iran against Turkey and Egypt, which are Muslim populated rival states in the region. The mainstream in Iran is withdrawing from Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which there is Iran’s signature under it and not giving attention to the world public opinion. Since war is a non-expected probability by Iranians, Iran’s main strategy and priorities are negotiating and using diplomatic ways. Iran sees Israel’s nuclear weapons as a big threat to itself and wants international laws to be applied in Israel issue. Unluckily, what weakens Iran’s strategy is that Iran accepted these laws by signing and Israel did not.

When we look from the side of USA, not interestingly Democrats and Republicans have similar strategies about Iran’s nuclear issue. American public opinion opposes Iran’s “nuclearization” as a whole. USA, who paid the bill of Iraq War heavily by itself because of not bearing in mind the others, cannot act similarly in Iran. There are several options in front of Obama Administration:
-Application of political and economic enforcements,
-Striking Iran’s nuclear power plants,
-Limited invasion of Iran in terms of time and space,
-The most interesting one for me, changing the regime in Iran.

How many of these can be implemented completely? How economic sanctions and limitations can be applied to people, who live under very low living standards? How waging a war can be effective against an administration, which declared that if there will be a strike against Iran, it will be reciprocated by counter strikes in anywhere in the world? After all these, the best and only option is to make a regime change in Iran by supporting the opponents of status quo. The repressive environment after elections, which Ahmedinejad won, is a basis for this view.

Finally, I want to mention that there are many American military bases and deployed soldiers in Iraq, Turkey and Gulf states. This military existence is a big security problem for Iran. As a result Iran gravitates to nuclear armament to securitize itself. I think maybe the best solution to reduce the tension between both USA-Iran and in the region is to make some suggestions about Iran’s security. This is the life ring of not only the regional peace but also the alliance of civilizations.

Nail ELHAN

Turkey’s Kurdish issue, in this sense, is one of the stumbling blocks of Turkey on the road to EU accession. On October 3, 2005, when the European Union formally initiated accession negotiations with Turkey, more attention than ever was focused on the Kurdish problem of Turkey.

Until recently, Turkey was even denying to have such a problem as Kurdish. For example, leader of a 1980 military coup, Kenan Evren, in his famous speech, “considered” Kurds not as a separate nation, but “mountain Turks” whose names are coming from the sound of their shoes(“kart-kurt”) while they are walking in the snow. It has not been long before that Turkish government admitted the existence of Kurdish problem. Not long ago, speaking Kurdish was a crime according to the law, and anyone who challenged this law was judged. Therefore, it was sensation when Prime Minister of Turkey, Mr. Erdogan admitted that there is a Kurdish problem. Until then, this problem was “pronounced” as “southeastern problem” or “southeastern issue”.

Actually, this problem has various subcategories like education in Kurdish, or terror issue. The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) is the breakpoint of the Kurdish problem. The dynamics of the events concerning the the problem is an example of its seriousness. On June 1, 2004, PKK declared the termination of the truce. Since then, the number of casualties caused by terrorist acts has increased five times(Guryev, 2008, n.p.). Victims are mainly the civilian population, who are killed by mines laid by militants. In order to neutralize terrorist groups in the area, in May, 2005, Turkish armed forces launched a massive operation, which destroyed more than 100 militants and about 40 troops, as Guryev(2008) writes(n.p).

In such a situation, the decision of the European Court of Human Rights, accepted 12 May 2005, that the Kurdistan Workers’ Party leader Abdullah Öcalan was tried unfairly, led to a sharply negative reaction from Turkish government, including the military circles of the country. Their main concern was the fact that the possible revision of Öcalan’s case, may give a rise to huge clashes throughout the country. Furthermore, it led to the increase of already high tension towards the EU. To explain, the European Union’s “apparent silence” towards Italy, Greece, and Germany at the times when these countries “refused to bring Öcalan to the justice” did increase the tension of Turkey and the EU relations(Düzgit, 2006, pp.22-23). Secondly, impacts of the Kurdish problem on Turkey and the European Union are quite influential. On October 3, 2005, with the outbreak of accession negotiations between Turkey and the EU, Turkey’s Kurdish problem gained new shape.

According to Gunter(2006), professor of political science at Tennessee Technological University in Cookeville, Turkey may solve this problem according to the principles of the Copenhagen Criteria, and by doing this she will have met the expectations of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk: …Indeed, the way to solve the Kurdish problem in Turkey may prove to be through the Copenhagen Criteria, which mandate the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and protection of minorities. There is no bargaining on these criteria. Turkey is required to accept them for entry into the EU. For all Turks who want to fulfill Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s ultimate goal of achieving contemporary civilization and for the ethnic Kurds living in Turkey, EU membership for Turkey will be a win/win situation because it would guarantee Kurdish rights within the confines of Turkey’s territorial integrity… n.p

After analyzing the past and the present circumstances around the Kurdish problem, it can be deducted that “the speechs” or views on the Kurdish problem has(had) nothing to do with resolution. Above all, as a “foreigner” in Turkey, I can notice the existing prejudice against Kurds among the citizens. Although these prejudiced people are those with low education, unfortunately, there are quite a lot people with high education and at the same time, with prejudices. I may be argued that, the EU Commission does not make the solving of the Kurdish problem obligatory for Turkey. However, this is the fact that if the EU was to put the Kurdish problem at the front of the negotiations, the consequences, such as unfavorable change of Turkish public opinion towards the union, may affect relations hazardously. Therefore, the EU “considers”(or at least wants to consider) the Kurdish problem “just as terrorism issue at most a limited human rights problem”(Gunter, 2006, n.p). In my opinion, this means that to overcome this obstacle, Turkish government should give great importance to educating people, above all, educating the educators so that they be more tolerant and give more importance to teach tolerance.

Cemil ISLAMOV

People who travels eastern Turkey, know our women, who die as if they have never existed…

And these travelers listen up to stories of these young women who were the victim of honour killings, and stories of women whose education is interrupted either by his father or due to poverty, and stories of women who are forced to keep silence in front of all these stories…

A person with a soul, can’t stop writing about the souls who did manage to get their freedom in such a dark world of that region, and indeed about whom who helped them in their way of freedom.

Güleser Çelik is one of those souls “who grew as if a snowdrop is growing against the frost…obstinately…”. And this is the story of the Snowdrop, in which she goes to New-York.

With her straight posture Güleser Çelik, by attending to the discussion panel in the UN about ‘the status of women’ within the framework of Kardelenler[Snowdrops] project, addressed her calm speech to our women. In the discussion panel which held on March 2, with her eyes full of hope, reminded to everyone that one day, in this country, women’s fate should and will be changed.

“Education is the struggle against injustice, corruption, unfairness, and oppression of the world. Education is the only way for us to live honestly and like a human.” In fact, a third year student at the department of International Relations in Middle East Technical University, Güleser Çelik, was not only the voice of Turkish women, but also the women who are under the oppression in all over the world.

Minister of State Aliye Kavaf and writer Elif Şafak also participated as spokespersons in the panel discussion organized within the framework of Kardelenler project by Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği[The Association in Support of Contemporary Living] and Turkcell. Çelikel, chief of the association, stated that he is proud of the fact that Kardelenler, as a project-providing equal opportunities for women-will be shared.

Kardelenler and other similar projects help Turkish women by providing equal opportunities in their education and ring the bells of shiny future.What we hope is that we will be able to live those happy days when we would be proud of those successful, honourable, active women who lives like a human, but not of projects providing equal opportunities in education for women in this country

Gülşah ASLANTÜRK