Kurdish question stems from the emergence of nationalism at the end of the Ottoman Empire times. Like Armenians and many other minorities within the empire, Kurdish people wanted their independence too. However, because the Kurds and the Turks were all Muslim and under the umbrella of the caliphate, they strived together for the victory against the Allies for saving the caliphate. However, when the Ottoman Empire collapsed Kurds were divided by the national borders; some of them were in the Iran borders, some of them were in the Iraq borders and some of them were in the newly established Turkish Republic borders. Therefore, the identity of Kurds was fragmented. They were the only ethnic group or nation which did not end up by their nation state and it seemed difficult to have one anymore because they were all scattered around the states. Furthermore, even they supported Independence War against the Allies; Turkish Republic did not recognize them after foundation and established the nation state for only Turks. Moreover, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk also abolished the caliphate in 1924 which was the common ground for Kurds and Turks.  However, Ataturk promoted the motto of ‘Ne mutlu Türk’üm Diyene!’ best translated as ‘Happy is whoever says I am a Turk’ not whoever is a Turk. To be Turk meant to live within the boundaries of the republic and thereby to be its citizen (Radu, 2003). However, Kurds felt betrayed. With the political student movements in the 1960s and the Barzani’s revolt in 1961-1975 in Iraq, Kurdish opposition movement were also able to organize itself with the establishment of PKK in 1974(Roy, 2005).

Kurdish insurgency in Turkey actually gets supports both from the West and Third World countries. The West sees these problems as a matter of oppression or denial of rights by a majority of group, Turks, of an ethnic minority, Kurds. However, when you ask any of Turkish people, they would deny oppression of Kurds. Especially, Turkish elites argue that there is no problem of oppression but socioeconomic problem in the southeastern part of the state where many Kurds inhabit. Many of the elites also believe that terrorist groups within this minority group are strongly supported by the foreign states aiming at weakening Turkey.

In fact, what those people think is not just a conspiracy theory. PKK was always seen as an opportunity by the neighbor states to weaken Turkey. Greece, Syria, The Republic of Cyprus and Iran supported the existence of PKK in Turkey by both supplying them financial aid and also hosting them in their territories. Specifically, the reason for Syria to support PKK was manifold. The first reason; there was a conflict between Turkey and Syria over Hatay after French colonization in the region. Secondly, Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi (GAP) was a huge project which was planned to use water from Euphrates and Tigris Rivers to irrigate large tracts of the arid region. With this project the Southern part of Turkey was aimed to be developed and increased the amount of harvest even 6 times. However, Syria perceived this as a treat to itself fearing it would affect the amount of water Syria could get from these rivers.  Therefore, it supported both Kurdish terrorist group PKK and Armenian terrorist groups like ASALA against Turkish Republic. Other states generally, like Greece and Iran, did not want to have a strong Turkey just next to them and supported PKK against Turkish Republic. It is doubtful whether PKK could have attained anything close to the position it did without foreign support (Radu, 2005).

We should keep in mind that Kurdish problem in Turkey is distinct from the problem of PKK terrorism. Not every Kurdish people support what PKK does. Only 29% of the Kurdish population viewed PKK as the best representative of Kurdish people. Moreover, majority of Kurdish people want to remain within Turkish state (Milliyet Gazetesi, 1992). Originally, PKK was established based on Marxist- Leninist ideology in 1973 by Abdullah Öcalan. It was to advocate the creation of a Marxist-Kurdish state. PKK agenda described Kurdistan area under a colonial rule and the tribal leaders are the comprador colluded to help the state exploit the lower classes. This Marxist approach was the basic reason for Soviet help to PKK during Cold War. However, in 1990s we see a shift in PKK politics from Marxist to nationalist. This is basically because the region people were not interested in ideologies and were wary of them. Nationalism, on the other hand, was familiar to them and in accordance with their actual aim: independent Kurdish State. Therefore, with nationalist approach PKK was able to attract more people from Kurdish grassroots.

Even Kurdish minority is a hot topic in Turkish politics; Turkey is neither a bipolar nor a deeply divided society like Rwanda or Sri Lanka. Open tensions in society between Turks and Kurds remain minimal. Kurdish people is the most populous minority in Turkey and they are the only one Ataturk’s nation building did not succeed. There is irrefutable ethnic aspect but the core in Kurdish problem is oft-neglected social, economic, political and ideological dimensions, which makes it different from ethnic conflicts in Kosovo, Chechnya, Rwanda and Liberia too. The Kurdish areas have consistently lagged behind the rest of Turkey in terms of economic development due largely to the preservation of the tribal structures and the neglect of central government. Tribal leaders of course have an interest in preventing rapid modernization which would inevitably weaken the traditional social structures that perpetuate their power. As a result, they have in all likelihood encouraged a certain lack of attention to their region on the part of central authorities (p.130, Radu, 2005).  This lack of state investment later caused lack of education, infrastructure and resulted in underdevelopment in the region, which will eventually cause emergence of terrorist groups in the name of ‘freedom fighter’. Basically, the reason for this underdevelopment in the region is seen as an economic racism done by the government against Kurdish people and a ground for the rebellion.

With the coup d’état in 1980 in Turkey, government’s approach toward PKK and Kurdish people had an extreme condition. There was more repressive and ignorant approach. Military government leader Evren even rejected the existence of the Kurdish and said there is nothing like Kurds but a sound when you walk on the snow similar to ‘Kurd’ sound and the people who name themselves as Kurds are the people who lived in snowy places most of the time and got this nickname. This became a government policy and many generations grew up assuming that Kurdish people actually belonged to Turkish origins but somehow they were rebellion (Radikal Gazetesi, 2007). By this way Kurdish people compelled either to be a member of PKK to have a voice or either got assimilated in Turkish culture. Any peaceful advocacy of Kurdish rights would attract the wrath of both the state and the PKK (Radu, 2005).

Turkey lost so much energy on this issue. The allocation of military spending is even higher than national education spending. Turkey wants to be an EU member and a strong state in the region. Some negotiations between EU and Turkey were just about minority problems in Turkey. It is essential to solve this issue by peaceful manners and please the Kurdish people without preventing Turkey from being a strong state. This ‘Kurdish Problem’ hunch is always emerging especially in critical times, like EU negotiations. This Kurd-Turk distinction is so unnecessary and damaging Turkey’s developmental state aims.

Solutions to this conflict lie in the democratization process. Turkish government should abolish any law restricting cultural rights .However; Ankara still sometimes refrains from letting Kurdish legal and political representation. It perceives them as a menace to national security and as a separatist terrorism. However, it is known by experience in the past that preventing them participating from politics is much more destructive. Additionally, some scholars argue that government should allow education in the mother language for the Kurds claiming it will enable them to learn their identity and be a part of the society at the same time. However, government is afraid of that it may cause a fragmentation in the society and secession of the state. That seems reasonable because by this way you may create a society even cannot speak the same language. Turkish government right now does not recognize any diploma taught in any ethnic language but allows opening Kurdish courses and Kurdish departments in the universities.

Furthermore, the Southeastern part of Turkey needs to be developed by being industrialized. However, government should pay attention to the distribution of wealth over there because in the past the gain was just for the landlord but not the peasants. Actually over the years, governors and NGOs try to resolve this issue by implementing new projects in the region. ’Kardelen’ project, for example, was aiming bringing girls to the school in the region and was quite successful.

Populated mostly by Kurdish people the Southeastern part of Turley has been witnessing state-oriented investments nowadays. Most recently, Kurdish people have a state-controlled TV channel which is broadcasting in Kurdish. Even some universities are arguing opening a department of Kurdish language and literature and they are allowed to do so by the law anymore. Other than cultural investments, state tries to make the region more attractive to the private investment by lowering the tax here. It is believed that if the unemployment rates decrease, there would be less people who will be willing to a part of PKK. These progresses are more than welcome by the Kurdish society. Turkish people are also hopeful that maybe these new rights and developments will satisfy the Kurds and this conflict will reach to an end. Neither Kurdish mother nor Turkish mother wants to sacrifice their sons in the battle for this endless conflict anymore.  Turkey has won the war against PKK in 1999 and right now it needs to win the peace (Radu, 2005).

Melike Baştürk

References

1. Berkan, I. (2007). The Problem of Terror and Kurds. Radikal Newspaper. (6^th of November)

2. Roy O., the editor (2005). Turkey Today: A European Country?.

3. Radu S. Michael, the editor (2003). Dangerous Neighborhood: Contemporary Issues in Turkey’s Foreign Relations. The Kurdish Question in Turkish Politics by Svante E. Cornell, 126-140.

4. The Survey Results Published in Milliyet Newspaper, 6^th September 1992.

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Different theories  from different disciplines produce different explanations to the questions on EU actorness leading  to large debates in the literature. As for the collective identity formation at EU level, the constructivists argue through a process of intense foreign policy cooperation and institutionalisation shared standards of behaviour, a common identity are developed which brings about the collective action at the end, while liberal institutionalists puts more emphasis on the extent of international interdependence as the catalisator for the collective action. [2] The intergovernmentalists focus on the shared and overlapping interests of the member states as against the realists who argue that external threats and powers lead to collective action and alliance formation.[3] Not only the motivations for the collective action at the EU level but also the limitations to it have constituted divergence in the academic literature. The fist and the famous ‘capabilities-expectations gap’ theory of Christopher Hill reveals the gap between the expectations of collective EU action and the EU’s capacity to deliver it, while Stanley Hoffman with ‘logic of diversity’ argument focuses on the diverging interests of the member states which are difficult to reconcile. The bureaucratic politics between the institutions in Brussels or the pillar structure has been proposed as hurdles for the collective action while David Allen links the foreign policy to the idea of state with a set of interests identified by a government .[4] Realists see EU as incapable of using coercive military force due the the inability of the member states to act collectively on hard core policy issues where national interests can not coverge which as in Kagan’s words is the result of a Hobbesian international system as against to the Kantian one.[5]

As the questions on the existance of European Foreign Policy are invalidated with the behavioural evidences on the influence of the EU in world politics, more attention needs to be directed towards the  issue of what exactly EU foreign policy is,  what it stands for, what it does, or in other words taking the existance of EU foreign policy as given then what is its raison d’etre.[6] In order to find the right answer to the question at hand, it is necessary to understand the evolution of the EU foreign policy system including the institutions, the formal rules, norms; the policy making process and the impact of common policies on the system itself, on EU member states, on the world, as well as the its justifications.

European European has develeoped as civilian power from the very beginning especially institutionalised Europe has been successful in excluding force as an element in interstate relations and been called as zone of peace since the demolition of Berlin Wall which continued until the post-cold war era where European governments and leaders faced with the challenge of justifying their public expenditures on military forces. The conecpt of ‘civilian power Europe’ developed in 1970s by Duchene focused on mainly the division of labor between US focusing on force and Europe spreading prosperity and democracy. European Union’s self image was constructed around the seperation of soft-civilian power reinforced by trade incentives and financial assistance from hard military power. Institutionalised Europe has been associated with the force for good, spreading civilized values across the globe, promoting human rights.[7] Altough most of the literature on the EU’s foreign policy is explained on the definite results it produces to the collective or individiual interests of the EU member states, the notions of ‘eurocentric power or normative power’ EU are necessary to be employed for justifying EU’s foreign policy with a referrence first to common values, second to universal principles. While Manners puts the argument that EU can be conceptualized as a normative power which is normatively different  and promotes universal norms and principles in its relations with non-members[8], another argument has been raised by Bretherton and Volgler on the tendency of the EU to reproduce itself in its relations with non-members referring to patterns of interdependence ‘through the external projection  of internal solutions’.[9]

Paralell to normative or civilizing connotations of the EU foreign policy, the logics  underpinning the EU foreign policy were a matter of discussion. As Sjursen and Smith says EU foreign policy can be explained as an effort to find efficient solutions to concrete problems; or as a reference to what is considered as appropriate given a particular group’s conception of itself and what it represents ; as well as set of  principles mutaually recognized as morally acceptable and just by all parties.[10] In fact the detailed analysis of different waves of the enlargement and different conditionality terms put forward through both enlargement and neighbourhood policies will reveal the fact that EU is not en entity to be limited within the boundaries of a specific approach and logics. All three elements are present in the logics underpinning the EU foreign policy and EU carries elements of both civilizing power projecting its understanding of norms to the rest of the world and normative power promoting universal norms.

The most effective instrument of the EU’s foreign policy over the past 30 years has been the promise of enlargement conditional on the acceptance of some political and economic criteria by the candidate states.  During the cold war EU membership was not a matter of concern since the membership of the states other than the west European countries was not on the agenda while the other west European countries were not so interested in EU membership. When we come to 1970s first enlargement wave to Britain, Ireland and Denmark were realized without the membership criteria.  Infact till 1978 the conditionalty did not become a matter of concern when the European Council declared that ‘respect for and maintenance of representative democracy and human rights’ in each memberstate are essential elements of membership as a clear signal to Greece, Spain and Portugal to proceed with democratisation. In fact the clarification of democracy as a membership criteria was crucial in terms of showing that the European integration is not only an economic project but linked to deeper values with the first signals of its normative connotation.[11]

Bichi while classifying theoretical approaches and arguments about the EU, talks about mainly two broad criteria of inclusiveness nad reflexivity and labels the cases where EFP is neither inclusive nor reflexive as civilizing power. He also makes a referrence to the tendency of institutions to export institutional isomorphism and defines EU unreflexively eurocentric. [12]

According to Manners and Sjursen, normative value of EU rests on the universal character of the principles it promotes; i.e. EU acts normatively when it promotes values that empower actors affected by EFP. Shortly, normative power of EU shall be capable of giving voice to people outside Europe. The issue of reflexivity is not free of division which sharply divides between rationalist and sociological institutionalism. While rationalist and sociological institutionalist portray EU as eurocentric with no room for outsiders, constructivists draws a more inclusive picture for EU. Rationalists argue that EU intentionally exports norms from which it benefits with only enough attention to the receiving end for the beneficial effect to occur which rests on the logic of consequentionalism and expected outcome of the rational choices. This argument that EU promotes its norms because it expects to benefit from their adoptation as a reflexive and eurocentric entity, is being supported by Youngs and Hyde-Price. Young says that promotion of human rights is a part of EU’s general strategy of consolidating regimes and taking third party support fot the EU. Also Haddadi puts forward a similar argument saying that EU promotes the human rights in Maghreb countries to provide security and stability in the area. Moreover, Hyde and Price define EU as a regional hegemon trying to shape the external area by using both soft and hard power.[13]

More radical argument belongs to sociological institutionalists who mainly focus on the institutional isomorphism as a rule for the EFP where norms are exported unreflexively with a single model promoted to all its partners regardless of their context. EU’s projecting its own identity of democratic polity into its relations with third countries is explained by Bözel and Risse’s words as ‘one single cultural script’ or ‘one size fits all’ attidue.[14]

Contrary to the eurocentrism put emphasized by the rationalists, for constructivists EU promotes norms of universal value as an inclusive entity. As the time passes, the line between reflexivity and unreflexivity blurs and an intentional behaviour at the beginning will be a routine which is quite close to the famous ‘path dependency’ argument of historical institutionalism according to which the repetition of communications and practices lead to a standardisation of practices and an eventual change in actor’s reciprocal disposition. In this sense, constructivists focus more on the inclusive character of EU’s foreign policy with the norms and values having universal character.

Whether the diversity of approaches and debates on European Foreign Policy is a signal for the health in the literature or rather a ‘cacophony of dissonant voices’ is a matter of discussion as Walter Carlsnaes argues. He focuses on the need for an emprical research on the EU international actorness instead of giving effort to find a dominant approach explaining the evolution and working of the system.[15] EU as a sui generis entity different from the socalled international actors as states, state-like actors, without any government but with a form of governance, can not be easily explained within the boundries of the ‘foreign policy actorness’ legal definition.  On the other hand as the behavioural observations indicate EU compared to many states or state-like actors exerts more influence on the international arena even affecting in a direct or indirect way the policy decisions executed within the third countries as well as the reforms taken through the famous notion of ‘conditionality’ as it was the case in Turkey. As the constructivist argument says, there occurs an emotional environment between the EU and third countries within which both sides form expectations from eachother through some policy tools, hence EU at the end appears as en entity unique to be investigated over which foreign policy actorness should be redefined as against the traditional terms.

Rather than limiting the analysis to the justification of EU’s actorness on one of these aproaches, or giving effort to explain EU’s foreign policy within the boundaries of the selective approaches, it is better to base the analysis on the emprical and historical research of the evolution of EU foreign policy system  (the institutions, the formal rules, the informal norms), the policy-making process and impact of common policies or the failure to agree common policies on the system itself, on EU member states as well as on the world.[16] This emprical research will lead us to approach from a broader perspective to the question ‘Is the EU a normative power, promoting universal values or is it a eourocentric civilizing power projecting its own understanding of norms onto the rest of the world or both?  While capturing the answer the policy tools employed by the EU and its impacts vis a vis member states, candidate countries and the rest of the world should be the subjects of emprical analysis, namely enlargement and neighbourhood policies of the EU.  The emprical analysis of EU foreign policy around those policy tools will bring us to the logics underpinning the EU enlargement and neighbourhood policy.

Diğdem Tümtürk

[2] Alexender Wendt, ‘Collective Identity Formation and the International State”, American Political Science Review, 88, 2, 1994, pp. 389-390.

[3] Roy Ginsberg, The Foreign Policy Actions of the European Community (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989).

[4] David Allen, “The European Rescue of National Foreign Policy?”, in Hill, ed., The Actors in Europe’s Foreign Policy, p. 303.

[5] Robert Kagan, “Paradise and Power: America and Europe in New World Order”, (London: Atlantic Books, 2003)

[6] Ibid.

[7] William Wallace, “Is There a European Approach to War?”, European Foreign Policy Unit Working Paper, 2005, 2, p. 2.

[8] I. Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 2002, 40, p. 241.

[9] Bretherton, C. and Volgler, J., “The European Union as a Global Actor”,(London: Routledge, 1999), p.249.

[10] Sjursen and Smith, op.cit., p.3

[11] Federica Bicci, “Our Size Fits All”, European Foreign Policy Unit Working Paper, 2005/3, p.7.

[12] Ibid., p. 201.

[13] Ibid., p. 207.

[14] T.Börzel and T. Risse, “One Size Fits All! EU Policies for the Promotion of Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law”, Workshop on Democracy Promotion and the Rule of Law, 4-5 October, Stanford University.

[15] Walter Carlsnaes, “Where the Analysis of European Foreign Policy Going”, European Union Politics,5, 4, 2004, p.495.

[16] Karen E. Smith, “The EU in the World: Future Research Agendas”, European Foreign Policy Unit Working Paper, 2008/1, p. 3.

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Kurdish question can be explained by referring to the transformation of Turkey from a traditional society where the identities were religiously determined at communal level, to a modern society where the aim was to define an individual’s identity at the state level and the driving force behind this nationalism was Turkish nationalism.[1]

The nation has been defined on the bases of three different concepts throughout Turkish history which was “God” under the Ottoman Empire.  In Ottoman society the nationality was on the bases of religion which means that a person’s membership to a religious community was the determining element of nationality. In this sense, many Turks had little or no self awareness. The Ottoman Empire as an authoritarian monarchy with a religious foundation derived from Sultan’s claim that he was also caliph of the world, the spiritual head of the all Muslims of the world so it recognized minorities by defining them in religious terms and gave them extensive self-rule.[2] Both the logic of emperorship and that of Islam exceeded the logic of the nation in Ottoman.

Alongside the newborn nation states, the real inheritor of the Ottoman Empire has become a nation state that is Turkey and under huge efforts for nation building in Turkey, religion  gave its place to ‘nation’ where secularism got the upper hand over God.

In fact the transformation from Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic can be described as a transfer from “Ottoman patriotism” to “Turkish nationalism”. As the Ottoman Empire was disintegrating, the need to build a new order came to agenda. The population of Turkey would need a new identity which would replace the one based on religion and from 1923 onwards  Turkish nationalism came to agenda. This meant a break with the monarchy of the past, with the Islamic character of the state. The founders of the Turkish Republic had the aim of transforming Ottoman Empire to a modern and secular republic and in line with this aim from 1923 an increasing emphasis was given to developing a sense of nationhood based on the Turkish language in contrast to Ottoman Empire where ethnic identities  among the Muslim population had no much significance beyond the cultural and the linguistic.[3]

This notion of nationality continued until the the beginning of 2000s where greater commitment to EU membership opened the way for some political reforms  and increased the hopes for some solution to the Kurdish problem. For countries like Turkey where the real changes can not come from the bottom which is not conscious and enlightened enough to question and bring the change, a catalyser is needed to make people come around a common idea. In Turkish case, The EU acted as a crucial catalyst for some reforms to be brought into life as a civilian power which used carrots as against to sticks. Not the EU itself but the “idea of EU membership” has been the motivator for Turkey’s democratization or the so-called Europeanization process which includes reforms on human rights, plural democracy and minority issue. At the base of these reforms lies the idea to define “human” as the defining element of identity in Turkey which unfortunately was stuck today due to both internal and external dynamics as well as lack of real commitment of governments to the solution of the problem due to their short-visioned electoral concerns.

Shortly, much rests on how successful the governments are in implementing social/ political reforms and opinion makers are in shaping the society’s perception of the issue. Otherwise Turkish hardliners and Kurdish nationalists will come to the scene which means return to the very beginning. In this sense, Turkey by playing the game according to rules of 21^st century, being conscious diplomatic player in international arena instead of taking the role of East’s emotional and courageous rescuer should be very cautious and strong inside. Now is the time for promoting the idea of Turkey’s patriotism where “individual” is valuable just because of his/her existence, neither of religious nor ethnic origins.

Diğdem TÜMTÜRK

[2] Svante E. Cornell , ‘The Kurdish Question in Turkish Politics’, Orbis, 45, 1 (Winter 2001), p.32.

[3] Kirişçi, op.cit., p.280.

Since the end of the 1980s, a conflict emerged berween Azerbaijan and Armenia over the region of Nagorno-Karabakh. In 1992 the conflict culminated into the war between these countries. Cornell (2001), in his book Small nations and great powers: a study of ethnopolitical conflict in the Caucaus, writes how the conflict over this territory turned to be inter-state issue as well as the casualties of the war:

The conflict has led to over twenty thousands casualties and almost one and a half million refugees, a refugee flow which has resulted in a considerable crisis especially in Azerbaijan, with the number of displaced persons numbering close to one million. Over fourteen percent of the territory of Azerbaijan is occupied, territories which have been ethnically cleansed in the course of warfare of their Azeri population by Armenian Forces. The conflict is regarded as an internal conflict by the major powers and international organizations, and the efforts of the international community to bring an end to the conflict have been half-hearted at best and exiguous at worst. The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh clearly possesses an intra-state dimension, that of the struggle for independence on the part of the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh. However, since the beginning of 1992 the conflict also possesses an inter-state dimension in the sense that it involved two sovereign states as belligerents: Armenia and Azerbaijan… p. 31. … By early 1992, the power vacuum created by the dissolution of the Soviet Union led to the loss of the last factor containing the conflict. Thus with the imminent withdrawal of the formerly Soviet forces, Karabakh became the scene of what gradually increased to a full-scale war. The Armenian side, having prepared itself to solve the conflict through military means, did not loose any time to act. p. 61[i]

As stated above, the war outbroke just after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In fact, following the Glasnost and Perestroika policies of Gorbachev, the Soviet Union had already lost almost all its influences on its member republics. Most important fact is that people of this gigantic union themselves believed in the demise of the Soviet Union and its influence. Especially, people of Azerbaijan, after the January Massacre, done by the Red Army of the Soviet Union during the dissolution period, were among the strong believers to this demise. In these circumstances, nationalist movements became dominant in all post soviet republics. On the other hand, according to Abrahamian (1998), there always been nationalism in the Soviet Union in the form of “linguistic nationalism”, caused by the imposition of the Russian language to all Soviet republics instead of the mother tongue of each republic[ii]. Therefore, after dissolution of the Soviet Union, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict became a war between ‘Armenians’ and ‘Azerbaijanis’, or ‘Hays’ and ‘Turks’, according to Armenian nationalists of this period. Khojaly Massacre ‘performed’ by the Armenian army was the breaking point of the war making these two nations to turn to be enemies for several decades, as history approves. On the official website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan (mfa.gov.az) the settlement process of the conflict presented by the UN and OSCE is described below:

In general, the legal and political constituent for the settlement of the conflict is based on the norms and principles of international law, laid down in UN Security Council resolutions 822, 853, 874 and 884 as well as in the appropriate documents and decisions of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and other international organizations. As mentioned above, the UN Security Council resolutions were adopted in 1993 in response to the occupation of the territories of Azerbaijan and reaffirmed respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of the international borders of the Republic of Azerbaijan and all other States in the region. The Council demanded immediate cessation of all hostile acts, immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of occupying forces from all occupied regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan, and called for the restoration of economic, transport and energy links in the region, ensuring the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes. n. pag.[iii]

Until today, the settlement of the conflict is very (if not the most) significant issue in both domestic realm and the foreign policies of both countries. In this article, public opinion in Azerbaijan on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and its effects on Azerbaijan’s foreign policy will be briefly analyzed.

PUBLIC OPINION IN AZERBAIJAN ON NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT, IT’S IMPACT ON FOREIGN POLICY, AND OPINION-POLICY CONNECTION ON THE CONFLICT

1. 1. Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict as ‘Bread and Butter’ Issue in Domestic Realm

After the January Massacre, and the following declaration of independence followed by dropping the term ‘Soviet Republic’ from its name, Azerbaijan entered into the most difficult phase of its history, where social, economic and political upheavals waited for it.

Firstly, Karabakh War detoriorated the social life in all aspects and throughout the whole country. In addition to dead bodies of soldiers ‘went’ to all cities and villages, the people(now, refugees) displaced from their motherland, Dağlıq(Nagorny) Karabakh, flowed to all regions, especially to big cities of Azerbaijan. According to the report of Chloe Arnold (2002), Baku-based BBC correspondent, until the ceasefire established in 1994, ”an estimated 17,000 people had been killed, another 50,000 had been wounded, and 1.2 million had been forced from their homes. Today, many of the 100,000 Azeris who fled their villages in Nagorno-Karabakh are still living in abandoned railway cars, mud-brick houses, and tents”. Considering the size of population in Azerbaijan which approximately was 7 million(The State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan), it is obvious that the number of refugees which was over 1 million created deep social concerns in Azerbaijan. The refugees could not adapt to the ‘new life’ in another lands, and local people did not get well along refugees because they had to share already scarce resources with newcomers. For this and many another reasons, people felt such bitter consequences of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict on everywhere in daily life.

Moreover, economic life was as collapsed as demographic situation. Economy had already been collapsed as a result of the Soviet dissolution. According to the World Bank report (2002), “Most of the formerly Soviet states began the transition to a market economy in 1990-1991 and made efforts to rebuild and restructure their economic systems, with varying results. The process triggered a severe transition decline, with Gross Domestic Product (GDP) dropping by more than 40% between 1990 and 1995”[iv]. In addition to this, the unexpected and huge migration caused by Nagorno-Karabakh War paralyzed the already deteriorated economy. Inflation and unemployment were at the top of the problems and the public opinion on this issue was formed in a way that all the guilt for the current situation was seen on the Karabakh War, and its initiator-Armenia.

Furthermore, political situation in Azerbaijan was negatively affected by the Nagorno-Karabakh War. Ayaz Mutallibov, the head of the state since September 8, 1991, resigned from his post on March 6, 1992, under the pressure of Azerbaijan Popular Front (leader of which was Elçibey) due to failure in defending Khojaly and giving an opportunity to Armenian army to realize a genocide in Khojaly. The national presidential elections were held on June 7, 1992, and Elçibey was elected the President of Azerbaijan Republic by gaining over 50% of votes.[v] The same issue of Karabakh War made Elçibey also to resign from presidency, and apart from Karabakh issue, there was a threat of civil war in the country. It was not until 1996 the stability and order was established in Azerbaijan under the presidency of Haydar Aliyev. Political landscape, however, were the same throughout this period. Settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict were the first priority of these three governments although Mutallibov was communist while Elçibey and Aliyev rejected communism.

1. 2. Weight of Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict in Azerbaijan’s Foreign Policy

Generally, since the independence of Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh issue and its settlement have always been among the top priorities of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy. In their speeches, Azerbaijani officials, including president and foreign minister, always claimed about the opportunities that both Armenia and Azerbaijan could benefit if the conflict resolved within the frames of the integrity of Azerbaijani territories, that is, after Armenia’s withdrawal of its army from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. Elmar Mammadyarov, Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan, in his article published on Wall Street Journal (2008), once again emphasized the importance of the settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict not only for the parties of conflict but also for the region:

The current market price for oil and gas is high and we should be able to maximize the economic potential of our strategic resources. The unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, however, threatens the security of the existing pipeline infrastructure, preventing us from optimizing the region’s energy trade with Europe. For us in Azerbaijan this will impede economic growth, which has been averaging around 30% in the past few years. n. pag.[vi]

Above, in the excerpt, again it can be seen that official Azerbaijan wants to return its territorries at any cost and without any compromise. This is the real proof of the huge impact of public opinion on the foreign policy.

The question emerges: How it is possible for public opinion to have such huge links with  foreign policy on this issue?

1. 3. A Multiaxial Evaluation of the link between Foreign Policy and Public Opinion on Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

Nagorno-Karabakh issue, in general, is one of the issues which are difficult to be categorized as an issue solely belonging to domestic or foreign policies. It is for this reason that opinion-policy linkage on Karabakh issue is so huge and ‘fresh’. Therefore, it would be mistake to comment this issue without considering the socio-economic and political factors affecting this links. Based on ‘a Multiaxial Assessment of Policy Climate in Mediating Opinion-Policy Connections’ proposed by Shiraev and Sobel (2003), the link between opinion and policy can be analyzed by several dimensions and axes. There are two dimensions affecting the opinion-policy linkage. First one is ‘basic socio-economic and political factors’ which include two axes, namely, ‘political institutions and communications’ and ‘political landscape’. Second dimension is ‘basic cultural and psychological factors’, again which includes two axes, namely, ‘general socio-cultural variables’ and ’contextual and situational factors’[vii]. In order to clarify the affect of these dimensions and axes on opinion-policy linkage in Nagorno-Karabakh issue, on the Graph 1 the case is shown graphically.

Graph 1 – Analysis of impact of  several factors on foreign policy-public opinion connection on the issue of Nagorno Karabakh conflict

CONCLUSION

Considering the historical, political, social and economic factors on Nagorno-Karabakh issue and the policy-opinion connection on this issue, the following conclusions can be drawn.

First, the history made this conflict escalate into the war in which hundred thousands were killed and over a million people were internally displaced. Second, political life during the early independence period was full of upheavals and instability; however, the political atmosphere on the Karabakh issue has always remained unchanged. This is mainly because of the fact the public opinion has remained unchanged on the issue. Third, socio-economic factors were very effective in the process of opinion forming. The war was considered to be the father of all social and economic upheavals in the country. Fourth, the attention was drawn to the fact that on issues like Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, where it is not possible to categorize the issue solely as domestic or foreign, opinion-policy linkage is very huge because public opinion has great impact on foreign policy.

Jamil Islamov

[ii] Abrahamian, L. (1998, 08 01). Mother Tongue: Linguistic Nationalism and the Cult of Translation in Postcommunist Armenia. Berkeley, USA. Retrieved from http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/9cm4d9vn

[iii] Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (tarih yok). Republic of Azerbaijan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved on June 12, 2010, from http://www.mfa.gov.az/eng/khojaly_en/index.php

[iv] The World Bank. (2002). Transition: The First Ten Years – Analysis and Lessons For Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. Washington. DC.

[v] Academic dictionaries and encyclopedias.http://en.academic.ru/dic.nsf/enwiki/42307

[vi] Mammadyarov, E. (2008). The Caspian Moment. Wall Street Journal , 4.

[vii] Sobel, R., & Shiraev, E. (2003). International Public Opinion and the Bosnia Crisis. Lanham: Lexington  Books.

One of the most important policy fields in the EU is regional policy whose effective implementation depends on the compatibility of local and regional governance systems of member states with EU practice and regulatory norms. In line with the European Regional Policy, the potential member states pass through a transformation process where EU accession enacts as catalyst to the policy enhancement in terms of European Regional Policy standards. However, this period of policy transformation in candidate countries are not free of challenges. In that respect, Turkey constitutes a special case study in terms of its still ongoing adaptation process with EU regional policy regulations and norms. Turkey is a country with huge interregional disparities which has passed through a fast structural and policy changes in an unstable macroeconomic environment over a long period of time. Throughout this transformation period Turkey made remarkable attempts to develop a regional policy. Firstly, the transformation from a plan-driven import-substitution to an open export-based economy was realized in 1980 and further steps were taken to develop a fully market economy. The eventual admission of Turkey’s candidate status in the Helsinki European Council (1999) accelerated Turkey’s efforts in the way of harmonizing its policies with the acquis. From that time onwards, the policy transformation period posed some challenges to Turkey as other candidate countries.

In order to make a detailed examination of those challenges and Turkey’s actions as against to those challenges, it would be useful to make a comparative analysis of this transformation between a recently acceded country to the EU namely, ‘Poland’ and Turkey who had experienced similar challenges while adopting their regional policies to EU standards. Similarity in territorial length, average population and share of rural population in the total, sharp east-west division in terms of socio-economic development, levels of unemployment rates may be given as reasons laying behind our choice to study on Poland.

Moreover Polish experience of post-communist transition in early 1990s and Turkey’s transformation from a centrally planned economy to a more liberal in 1980s; the fact that both countries are characterized with huge disparities between West-East and Rural-Urban regions; centralization being an important hurdle in the way of implementing its regional policy in the pre-accession policy in both countries; and the dominant position of sectoral policies over regional policies for long years again both in Turkey and Poland, constitutes another dimension which makes Poland and Turkey as suitable units for a comparative analysis.

PROBLEMS IN THE POLICY TRANSFORMATION IN TURKEY& POLAND: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

1. Regional Unevenness

It is usually argued that Turkey is characterized with huge internal disparities which means that Turkey’s accession to the EU would increase the already existing regional disparities within the EU. The western/eastern divide of Turkey in economical terms constitutes a significant hurdle on the way of Turkey’s policy transformation in line with EU conditionality. Despite Turkish economy’s long-term growth, the even development across the country could not be observed. Besides regional disparities, provincial disparities in the country are also unbearable. The disparities between the East and the West of Turkey can be related to the characteristics of the local politics executed in those regions besides the economic and social factors. The local politicians  in the West are approaching local problems and demands from a national-level perspective in that sense they put a great importance to their relations with Ankara in the way of achieving local political objectives. On the other hand, in the eastern part of the country due to the low-income and agriculture-based economy, the voters are highly involved in local politics and reflect their regional identity by this way.[i]

For Polish case, we can say that Poland faces serious problems of uneven regional development which constituted a hurdle in its progress to EU as well. Due to its historical heritage, Poland is still suffering from a division between the better developed western part and the lower developed eastern part division.[ii] Similar to Turkey, the eastern part of the country was portrayed as peripheral region by the regional planners in Poland and the post-communist systemic transformation of the national economy pointed out the weakness of the regional structure in the country which was shaped under central planning.[iii] The changes in industrial and agricultural production, the process of privatization and the spatial adaptation have not been uniformly intensive throughout the country on the basis of which lies the regional diversity, levels of wealth, dependence on production conditions and the level of social development.[iv] As a result, this transformation led to a polarized regional development with two groups of winner and looser regions between 1990-94 period.[v] The 1999 reform of country’s territorial organization has not greatly affected this spatial polarization of the country and this polarization continued to be a hurdle on the way of Poland’s regional policy harmonization with EU as it was the case in Turkey. The urban-rural tension continues to have an impact on the regional policy development of Poland. This division affected the direction of investments as well. Since the rural regions were in trouble surrounded with a weak infrastructure, poor privatization and fragmented agriculture were not attractive for the investors; they were directed towards the urban areas associated with well-developed infrastructure, strong privatization prospects and cheap labor.[vi] This regional unevenness in Polish case is quite similar to Turkish case in the sense that in both countries rural areas are highly differentiated in terms of their preparedness for EU accession, with the regions in the western part of the country in a much better position to overcome the EU membership than those in the East.

The regional disparities in both countries together with the general shift in the EU regional policy away from “equalization and solidarity” to “efficiency and competitiveness” led to concerns on the ability of the eastern regions  to meet the challenges in formulating and implementing the regional policy especially their scarce resources are taken into account which will deepen the regional disparities.

2. From Centralization to Decentralization: A Difficult Progress

In order to understand the complexity and uniqueness of the regionalization process in Turkey, it’s necessary to examine the regional structure in Turkey.  The unitary state in Turkey does not have a legal definition of “region”.[vii] Within the framework of the provincial system the main relations are centered on two actors, namely center and province. This is a quite centralized system in the sense that the center determines the performance of the provisions through financial and political measures.  What’ more the reforms realized in the way of accessing to EU did not change the top-to-bottom approach in regional policy implementation. The regionalization attempts by State Planning Organization and State Institute of Statistics were realized without collaborating with the regions and without giving them sufficient decision-making power and economic resources. This centralized nature of the governance led to a belief that “the centre knows the best”[viii] and this kind of an approach prevails the political culture of Ministries and SPO as well. This understanding in Turkey can be related to the absence of both capitalistic class and industrial heritage from the very beginning of the Republic which led to a state-led economy even after 1980s when the shift to economic liberalization was the case and this state-dependency diminished the importance of regional and local politics has to a great extent in Turkey.[ix]

As mentioned before this centralization is an Ottoman legacy consolidated by the nationalist government of the new Republic of Turkey. Recent years witnessed a transformation of this method of governance due to some external and internal pressures like the motivation to harmonize with EU for accession. In line with this transformation the constitution was amended several times with the aim of reexamining the administrative structures in the country. However, at the end of the day the public administration remained still highly-centralized since the laws don’t emphasize on local democracy and decentralization of power. What’ more the bureaucrats did not perceive the regional planning as a necessary function and since 1960, sectoral logic dominated the regional one and the national plannings were prepared in line. Although some proposals were made by the SPO to establish regional representations, the desire to implement those proposals was quite limited. One of the factors at the basis of the regionalization failures is problematic nature of the institutional structure at the central level. The horizontal coordination between the sectoral Ministries and SPO in regional planning could not be realized due to status questions of SPO vis-à-vis the Ministries.

Turkey’s centralized governance system constitutes a big challenge in Turkey’s harmonization of its regional policy with EU norms and regulations since it’s nor compatible with the multi-level governance at EU level. The absence of an intermediary institutional structure between the center and local made it difficult for Turkey to bring its regional policy to EU standards in the pre-accession periods.[x]

For Poland the centralization has been an important hurdle in the way of implementing its regional policy in the pre-accession policy although not as severe as in Turkey. As already mentioned before, the biggest weakness of Polish regional policy stemmed from centralization which was a legacy of Communist era. Within this system regions run from Warsaw and had no institutional capacity for self-managed development.[xi] After long years of a centralized system the 1999 reform delivered a decentralizing promise of equipping the country with administrative structure that would facilitate the EU entry. However, even after this transformation the Poland’s EU pre-accession programmes were largely managed within one central organizational framework which resulted in a big coordination problem. During the pre-accession period the funds were not coordinated as support instruments for regional development, meaning that they operated separately without any multiplier effect.[xii]

3. Priority of Sectoral Policy over Regional Policy

Despite the steps taken to establish new structures at regional level, the absence of a real agency or ministry for regional policy at national level led to SPO assuming the full competence on this area in Turkey and for nearly 40 years or more the SPO has been preparing five-year development plans on sectoral basis So in addition to the centrality we must add the sectoral understanding to define traditional planning method in Turkey. Within this approach, the plans were made to promote the development of certain sectors without considering the regional dimensions. Thus the incentives were directed to the businesses that will enable sectoral growth rather than development of needy regions. As an example to this understanding we can give the national development plans focusing largely economic measures and city plans at the local level without tackling the regional disparities.[xiii]

The same problem reveals itself while examining the Polish case. The National Development Programmes in Poland were composed of a complex set of priorities and initiatives. The so-called coordination problem in the implementation of those programmes led to implementation of regional initiatives and this predominance of the sectoral policy over regional policy led to the imbalanced regional development. This problem is related with one of the important principle governing the EU regional policy, the so-called ‘concentration’ principle. In line with this principle the candidate countries should concentrate the funds on most needy regions instead of directing it to sectors with a growth potential. However, in Turkey the resources most of the time were oriented to national industrialization rather than to the reduction of regional disparities. Even giving 35 provinces the status of Priority Development Areas in 1993 did not the direction of resources from industrialized provinces to underdeveloped ones. While these provinces received 15.7 percent of public investment in 1991, 12.4 percent in 1992 and 17.8 percent in 1993, provinces in Marmara and Aegean regions attracted more than 50 percent of the public investment.[xiv] The same concentration problem is relevant for Poland in its pre-accession period during which the workforce and finance were concentrated mainly in the largest Polish cities as it was the case in Turkey.

CONCLUSION

The comparative analysis above addresses the problematic dimensions of regional policy implementation in Turkey and led us to make concrete conclusions on the way recording a successful score for Turkey’s harmonization with acquis. First of all, in the pre-planning stage, regional analysis shall be realized from a broader perspective including the sharing of responsibilities among relevant ministries, regional agents and civil society organizations, meaning a shift from a centralized approach to a decentralized one. Moreover, the problems within the bureaucracy have to be solved for efficient regional governance as well. Although the EU conditionality has been a strong driving force for Turkey’s alteration of its regional governance, there are still counter forces within the bureaucracy acting against change.[xv]

Turkey has to take lessons from the experiences of existing EU countries to revise its regional policies and in order to increase the pace of its adaptation process with the acquis. In line with this revision the first step shall be to share and reorganize this responsibility. Also the regions shall firstly rely on their internal power instead of state dependency. The establishment of regional self-governments to implement regional policy is another lesson to be taken for Turkey in this pre-accession period. These regional self-governments are crucial in the sense that they will be able to make independent investment decisions to support economic activity and to establish cooperation between different institutions.[xvi] Most importantly, an accelerated and healthy period of policy transformation needs a qualitative change instead of quantitative financial transfers which means a radical change in the values, institutional structures and communication.

Diğdem Tümtürk

[ii]Poznan (Wielkopolskie), Wroclaw (Dolnoslaskie), Gdansk (Pomorskie) and Krakow (Malopolskie) and Warszawa (Mazowickie)[ii] are those limited number of prosperous regions which are located in the western and southern parts and backed by strong economic, cultural, scientific and academic centres and attracting high levels of investment hence creating lots of job opportunities, and boosting their economies. Please see Annex for detail information.

[iii] Miroslawa Czerny, Andrzej Czerny, “The Challenge of Spatial Reorganization in A Peripheral Polish Region”, European Urban and Regional Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1, (2002) p.60.

[iv] Justyna Weltrowska, “Economic Change and Social Polarization in Poland”, European Urban and Regional Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1, (2002) p. 49.

[v] The winning regions with a developed services and technical infrastructure, skilled kabor forces, a scientific and technological base before 1999 consists of Warsaw, Poznan, Cracow, Wroclaw, Gdansk, Szczecin, Bydgoszcz and Bielsko- Biala. The loosers are the old industrial regions (Lodz, Katowice, Walbrzych, Jelenia Gora, Legnica, Konin and Tarnobrzeg); recession regions (Koszalin, Slupsk, Olsztyn, Suwalki, Tırun, Wloclawek, Plock and Ciechanow); poorly developed regions ( Ostroleka, Lomza, Bialystok, Biala Podlaska, Siedlce, Chelm, and Zamosc)

[vi] Blazyca, Heffner and  Huhes, op.cit., p.265.

[vii] There are different examples for different conceptualizations of the term ‘region’ in Turkey. First of all, the country is divided into seven regions considering the climatic and topography conditions. Moreover the regional development projects initiated by the SPO like  Eastern Black Sea Regional Development Plan (DOKAP), Zonguldak-Bartin-Karabuk Regional Development Project used the term ‘region’ on a project basis.The South-eastern Anatolia Project (GAP) has a distinctive regional development administration regulated by a specific legislation. Another conceptualization of ‘region’  is about the Emergency State Region (OHAL) which was established in the South-eastern Anatolia to fight against terrorism.

[viii] Ebru Loewendahl-Ertugal, “Europeanization of Regional Policy and Regional Governance: The Case of Turkey”, European Political Economy Review, Vol. 3, No. 1, (Spring 2005) p.34.

[ix] Dulupçu, op.cit., pp. 105,106.

[x] Only exception to this is the South-eastern Anatolian Development Project (GAP) administration.

[xi] Miroslawa Czerny, “Uneven Urban and Regional Development in Poland”, European Urban and Regional Studies Vol.9, No. 1, (2002) p. 37.

[xii] Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse, “An Evaluation of the Regional Policy System in Poland: Challenges and Threats Emerging From Participation in the EU’s Cohesion Policy, European Urban and Regional Studies, Vol. 13, No. 2, (2006) p. 153.

[xiii] Loewendahl-Ertugal, op.cit., p.29.

[xiv] Ibid., pp.27,28.

[xv] Loewendahl-Ertugal, op.cit., p. 45.

[xvi] Grosse, op.cit., p.152.

Turkey’s Kurdish issue, in this sense, is one of the stumbling blocks of Turkey on the road to EU accession. On October 3, 2005, when the European Union formally initiated accession negotiations with Turkey, more attention than ever was focused on the Kurdish problem of Turkey.

Until recently, Turkey was even denying to have such a problem as Kurdish. For example, leader of a 1980 military coup, Kenan Evren, in his famous speech, “considered” Kurds not as a separate nation, but “mountain Turks” whose names are coming from the sound of their shoes(“kart-kurt”) while they are walking in the snow. It has not been long before that Turkish government admitted the existence of Kurdish problem. Not long ago, speaking Kurdish was a crime according to the law, and anyone who challenged this law was judged. Therefore, it was sensation when Prime Minister of Turkey, Mr. Erdogan admitted that there is a Kurdish problem. Until then, this problem was “pronounced” as “southeastern problem” or “southeastern issue”.

Actually, this problem has various subcategories like education in Kurdish, or terror issue. The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) is the breakpoint of the Kurdish problem. The dynamics of the events concerning the the problem is an example of its seriousness. On June 1, 2004, PKK declared the termination of the truce. Since then, the number of casualties caused by terrorist acts has increased five times(Guryev, 2008, n.p.). Victims are mainly the civilian population, who are killed by mines laid by militants. In order to neutralize terrorist groups in the area, in May, 2005, Turkish armed forces launched a massive operation, which destroyed more than 100 militants and about 40 troops, as Guryev(2008) writes(n.p).

In such a situation, the decision of the European Court of Human Rights, accepted 12 May 2005, that the Kurdistan Workers’ Party leader Abdullah Öcalan was tried unfairly, led to a sharply negative reaction from Turkish government, including the military circles of the country. Their main concern was the fact that the possible revision of Öcalan’s case, may give a rise to huge clashes throughout the country. Furthermore, it led to the increase of already high tension towards the EU. To explain, the European Union’s “apparent silence” towards Italy, Greece, and Germany at the times when these countries “refused to bring Öcalan to the justice” did increase the tension of Turkey and the EU relations(Düzgit, 2006, pp.22-23). Secondly, impacts of the Kurdish problem on Turkey and the European Union are quite influential. On October 3, 2005, with the outbreak of accession negotiations between Turkey and the EU, Turkey’s Kurdish problem gained new shape.

According to Gunter(2006), professor of political science at Tennessee Technological University in Cookeville, Turkey may solve this problem according to the principles of the Copenhagen Criteria, and by doing this she will have met the expectations of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk: …Indeed, the way to solve the Kurdish problem in Turkey may prove to be through the Copenhagen Criteria, which mandate the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and protection of minorities. There is no bargaining on these criteria. Turkey is required to accept them for entry into the EU. For all Turks who want to fulfill Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s ultimate goal of achieving contemporary civilization and for the ethnic Kurds living in Turkey, EU membership for Turkey will be a win/win situation because it would guarantee Kurdish rights within the confines of Turkey’s territorial integrity… n.p

After analyzing the past and the present circumstances around the Kurdish problem, it can be deducted that “the speechs” or views on the Kurdish problem has(had) nothing to do with resolution. Above all, as a “foreigner” in Turkey, I can notice the existing prejudice against Kurds among the citizens. Although these prejudiced people are those with low education, unfortunately, there are quite a lot people with high education and at the same time, with prejudices. I may be argued that, the EU Commission does not make the solving of the Kurdish problem obligatory for Turkey. However, this is the fact that if the EU was to put the Kurdish problem at the front of the negotiations, the consequences, such as unfavorable change of Turkish public opinion towards the union, may affect relations hazardously. Therefore, the EU “considers”(or at least wants to consider) the Kurdish problem “just as terrorism issue at most a limited human rights problem”(Gunter, 2006, n.p). In my opinion, this means that to overcome this obstacle, Turkish government should give great importance to educating people, above all, educating the educators so that they be more tolerant and give more importance to teach tolerance.

Jamil ISLAMOV

Here is the full content of the protocol:

Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey

Desiring to establish good neighbourly relations and to develop bilateral cooperation in the political, economic, cultural and other fields for the benefit of their peoples, as envisaged in the Protocol on the development of relations signed on the same day.

Referring to their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe,

Reconfirming their commitment, in their bilateral and international relations, to respect and ensure respect for the principles of equality, sovereignty, non-intervention in internal affairs of other states, territorial integrity and inviolability of frontiers,

Bearing in mind the importance of the creation and maintenance of an atmosphere of trust and confidence between the two countries that will contribute to the strengthening of peace, security and stability of the whole region, as well as being determined to refrain from the threat of the use of force, to promote the peaceful settlement of disputes, and to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms,

Confirming the mutual recognition of the existing border between the two countries as defined relevant treaties of international law,

Emphasizing their decisions to open the common border,

Reiterating their commitment to refrain from pursuing any policy incompatible with the spirit of good neighbourly relations,

Condemning all forms of terrorism, violence and extremism irrespective of their cause, pledging to refrain from encouraging and tolerating such acts and to cooperate against them,

Affirming their willingness to chart a new pattern and course for their relations on the basis of common interests, goodwill and in pursuit of peace, mutual understanding and harmony,

Agree to establish diplomatic relations as of the date of the entry into force of this Protocol accordance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 and to exchange Diplomatic Missions.

This Protocol and the Protocol on the Development of Bilateral Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey shall enter into force on the same day, i.e. on the first day of the first month following of instruments of ratification.

Signed in (place) on (date) in Armenian, Turkish and English languages authentic copies in duplicate. In case of divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail.

For the Republic of Armenia …

For the Republic of Turkey …

Protocol on Development of Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey

The Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey.

Guided by the Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey signed on the same day,

Considering the perspectives of developing their bilateral relations, based on confidence and respect to their mutual interests,

Determining to develop and enhance their bilateral relations, in the political, economic, energy, transport, scientific, technical, cultural issues and other fields, based on common interest of both countries,

Supporting the promotion of the cooperation between the two countries, in the international and regional organi9zations, especially within the framework of the UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the BSEC,

Taking into account the common purpose of both States to cooperate for enchancimg regional stability and security for ensuring the democratic and sustainable development of the region,

Reiterating their commitment to the peaceful settlement of regional and international disputes and the conflicts on the basis of the norms and principles of law,

Reaffirming their readiness to actively support the actions of eth international community in addressing common security threats to the region and world security and stability, such as terrorism, transnational organized crimes, illicit trafficking of drugs and arms,

1. Agree to open the common border within 2 months after the entry into force of this Protocol,

2. Agree to conduct regular political consultations between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the two countries;

implement a dialogue on the historical dimension with the aim to restore mutual confidence between the two nations, including an impartial scientific examination of the historical records and archives to define existing problems and formulate recommendations;

make the best possible use of existing transport, communications and energy infrastructure and networks between the two countries, and to undertake measures in this regard;

develop the bilateral legal framework in order to foster cooperation between the two countries;

cooperate in the fields of science and education by encouraging relations between the appropriate institutions as well as promoting the exchange of specialists and students, and act with the aim of preserving the cultural heritage of both sides and launching common cultural projects;

establish consular cooperation in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963 in order to provide necessary assistance and protection to the citizens of the two countries;

take concrete measures in order to develop trade, tourism and economic cooperation between the two countries;

engage in a dialogue and reinforce their cooperation on environmental issues.

3. Agree on the establishment of an intergovernmental bilateral commission which shall comprise separate sub-commissions for the prompt implementation of the commitments mentioned in operational paragraph 2 above in this Protocol. To prepare the working modalities of the intergovernmental commission and its sub-commissions, a working group headed by the two Ministers of Foreign Affairs shall be created 2 months after the day following the entry into force of this Protocol. Within 3 months after the entry into force of this Protocol, these modalities shall be approved at ministerial level. The intergovernmental commission shall meet for the first time immediately after the adoption of the said modalities. The sub-commissions shall start their work at the latest 1 month thereafter and they shall work continuously until the completion of their mandates. The timetable and elements agreed by both sides for the implementation of this Protocol are mentioned in the annexed document, which is integral part of this Protocol.

This Protocol and the Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey shall enter into force on the same day, i.e. on the first day of the first month following the exchange of instruments of ratification.

Signed in (place) on (date) in Armenian, Turkish and English authentic copies in duplicate. In case of divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail.

For the Republic of Armenia

For the Republic of Turkey

Annexed document: Timetable and elements for the implementation of the Protocol on development of relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey.

Timetable and elements for the implementation of the Protocol on development of relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey

Steps to be undertaken

Timing

1. to open the common border within 2 months after the entry into force of the Protocol on the development of relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey

2. to establish a working group headed by the two Ministers of Foreign Affairs to prepare the working modalities of the intergovernmental commission and its sub-commission 2 months after the day following the entry into force of the Protocol on the development of relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey

3. to approve the working modalities of the intergovernmental commission and its sub-commissions at ministerial level

within 3 months after the entry into force of the Protocol on the development of relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey

4. to organize the first meeting of the intergovernmental commission

immediately after the adoption of the working modalities of the intergovernmental commission and its sub-commissions at ministerial level

5. to operate the following sub-commissions:

the sub-commission on political consultations;

the sub-commission on transport, communications and energy infrastructure and networks;

the sub-commission on legal matters;

the sub-commission on science and education;

the sub-commission on trade, tourism and economic cooperation;

the sub-commission on environmental issues: and

the sub-commission on the historical dimension to implement a dialogue with the aim to restore mutual confidence between the two nations, including an impartial scientific examination of the historical records and archive to define existing problems and formulate recommendations, in which Armenian, Turkish as well as Swiss and other international experts shall take part. at the latest 1 month after the first meeting of the intergovernmental commission

Desiring to establish good neighbourly relations and to develop bilateral cooperation in the political, economic, cultural and other fields for the benefit of their peoples, as envisaged in the Protocol on the development of relations signed on the same day.Referring to their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe,Reconfirming their commitment, in their bilateral and international relations, to respect and ensure respect for the principles of equality, sovereignty, non-intervention in internal affairs of other states, territorial integrity and inviolability of frontiers,Bearing in mind the importance of the creation and maintenance of an atmosphere of trust and confidence between the two countries that will contribute to the strengthening of peace, security and stability of the whole region, as well as being determined to refrain from the threat of the use of force, to promote the peaceful settlement of disputes, and to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms,Confirming the mutual recognition of the existing border between the two countries as defined relevant treaties of international law,Emphasizing their decisions to open the common border,Reiterating their commitment to refrain from pursuing any policy incompatible with the spirit of good neighbourly relations,Condemning all forms of terrorism, violence and extremism irrespective of their cause, pledging to refrain from encouraging and tolerating such acts and to cooperate against them,Affirming their willingness to chart a new pattern and course for their relations on the basis of common interests, goodwill and in pursuit of peace, mutual understanding and harmony,Agree to establish diplomatic relations as of the date of the entry into force of this Protocol accordance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 and to exchange Diplomatic Missions.This Protocol and the Protocol on the Development of Bilateral Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey shall enter into force on the same day, i.e. on the first day of the first month following of instruments of ratification.Signed in (place) on (date) in Armenian, Turkish and English languages authentic copies in duplicate. In case of divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail.For the Republic of Armenia …For the Republic of Turkey …Protocol on Development of Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of TurkeyThe Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey.Guided by the Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey signed on the same day,Considering the perspectives of developing their bilateral relations, based on confidence and respect to their mutual interests,Determining to develop and enhance their bilateral relations, in the political, economic, energy, transport, scientific, technical, cultural issues and other fields, based on common interest of both countries,Supporting the promotion of the cooperation between the two countries, in the international and regional organi9zations, especially within the framework of the UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the BSEC,Taking into account the common purpose of both States to cooperate for enchancimg regional stability and security for ensuring the democratic and sustainable development of the region,Reiterating their commitment to the peaceful settlement of regional and international disputes and the conflicts on the basis of the norms and principles of law,Reaffirming their readiness to actively support the actions of eth international community in addressing common security threats to the region and world security and stability, such as terrorism, transnational organized crimes, illicit trafficking of drugs and arms,1. Agree to open the common border within 2 months after the entry into force of this Protocol,2. Agree to conduct regular political consultations between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the two countries;implement a dialogue on the historical dimension with the aim to restore mutual confidence between the two nations, including an impartial scientific examination of the historical records and archives to define existing problems and formulate recommendations;make the best possible use of existing transport, communications and energy infrastructure and networks between the two countries, and to undertake measures in this regard;develop the bilateral legal framework in order to foster cooperation between the two countries;cooperate in the fields of science and education by encouraging relations between the appropriate institutions as well as promoting the exchange of specialists and students, and act with the aim of preserving the cultural heritage of both sides and launching common cultural projects;establish consular cooperation in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963 in order to provide necessary assistance and protection to the citizens of the two countries;take concrete measures in order to develop trade, tourism and economic cooperation between the two countries;engage in a dialogue and reinforce their cooperation on environmental issues.3. Agree on the establishment of an intergovernmental bilateral commission which shall comprise separate sub-commissions for the prompt implementation of the commitments mentioned in operational paragraph 2 above in this Protocol. To prepare the working modalities of the intergovernmental commission and its sub-commissions, a working group headed by the two Ministers of Foreign Affairs shall be created 2 months after the day following the entry into force of this Protocol. Within 3 months after the entry into force of this Protocol, these modalities shall be approved at ministerial level. The intergovernmental commission shall meet for the first time immediately after the adoption of the said modalities. The sub-commissions shall start their work at the latest 1 month thereafter and they shall work continuously until the completion of their mandates. The timetable and elements agreed by both sides for the implementation of this Protocol are mentioned in the annexed document, which is integral part of this Protocol.This Protocol and the Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey shall enter into force on the same day, i.e. on the first day of the first month following the exchange of instruments of ratification.Signed in (place) on (date) in Armenian, Turkish and English authentic copies in duplicate. In case of divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail.For the Republic of ArmeniaFor the Republic of TurkeyAnnexed document: Timetable and elements for the implementation of the Protocol on development of relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey.Timetable and elements for the implementation of the Protocol on development of relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of TurkeySteps to be undertakenTiming1. to open the common border within 2 months after the entry into force of the Protocol on the development of relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey2. to establish a working group headed by the two Ministers of Foreign Affairs to prepare the working modalities of the intergovernmental commission and its sub-commission 2 months after the day following the entry into force of the Protocol on the development of relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey3. to approve the working modalities of the intergovernmental commission and its sub-commissions at ministerial levelwithin 3 months after the entry into force of the Protocol on the development of relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey4. to organize the first meeting of the intergovernmental commissionimmediately after the adoption of the working modalities of the intergovernmental commission and its sub-commissions at ministerial level5. to operate the following sub-commissions:the sub-commission on political consultations;the sub-commission on transport, communications and energy infrastructure and networks;the sub-commission on legal matters;the sub-commission on science and education;the sub-commission on trade, tourism and economic cooperation;the sub-commission on environmental issues: andthe sub-commission on the historical dimension to implement a dialogue with the aim to restore mutual confidence between the two nations, including an impartial scientific examination of the historical records and archive to define existing problems and formulate recommendations, in which Armenian, Turkish as well as Swiss and other international experts shall take part. at the latest 1 month after the first meeting of the intergovernmental commission

Above information is the part of the story which is on the protocol papers. On the other side of the story, although certain issues were resolved, there emerged certain problems demanding resolution. In the category of resolved problems, in my opinion, there are border issue which was ended in reopening, and obvious international pressure on Turkish government for keeping Armenia in blockade, which will disappear. However, for both countries, there emerged a set of problems. For Turkey, problems emerged as early as the first official information came about the possibility of Turkey’s reopening its borders with Armenia. Gul government faced strong opposition coming from the country’s leading opposition parties, MHP and CHP.  Nationalist wing accuses government for “betrayal” to national interests and deep rooted relations with Azerbaijan. For instance, MHP’s leader Bahceli, in one of his speech, claimed that this protocol just meets Armenia’s “illegitimate” demands and clashes with the national interests of Turkey. In addition, a day after signing of protocol, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan Republic officially released a statement which indicates the worries of official Baku. In the statement, it is emphasized that the protocol will damage “the long standing brotherhood between Azerbaijan and Turkey”, and it will negatively affect the peace process in the region. However, “Azerbaijani foreign ministry spokesman told BBC that there was a chance that the Turkish-Armenian protocols might never be ratified by Turkey’s parliament and that he could not comment until they had” (BBC.co.uk). On the other hand, Armenian government is also experiencing harsh opposition of Dasnak Sutyun party, which was in the power during the Armenian Armed Forces occupation of Azerbaijani territory.  In recent meetings the same “betrayal” expression is frequently used by the activists. However, in the statement, which was officially provided by the Foreign Ministry of Republic of Armenia a day after a protocol being signed, it is pointed out that the protocol is an indicator of Armenia’s long lasting efforts of making a peace in the region. Furthermore, Jirinovskiy, Vice-Chairman of the State Duma of Russian Federation, in a interview with Azerbaijani journalists, stated that although Russia always “helped” Armenia, “now it chooses to be a friend of Turkey because of the fact that Russia cannot afford to help Armenia. In my opinion, although it may seem a bit simple thesis, this protocol should have been signed even before. Signing a protocol today is a “carrot policy”, according to Turkish officials. In this sense, according to them, it is not efficient to urge Armenian government to withdraw its Armed Forces from occupied territory, which is actually the UN Security Council’s decision that includes “the unilateral withdrawal of occupying forces from the Zangelan district and thecity of Goradiz, and the withdrawal of occupying forces from other recently occupied areas of the Azerbaijani Republic (UN Security Council, 1993). For this reason, among Turkish officials there are still continuing confusion as “maybe there should have been used a “stick policy””. However, some officials considering the opening border between two countries, think that Turkey would be more effective in peace process in the region, and stick policy, in this concept, would still exist in the form of Turkey’s possible threat of closing the border. Nevertheless, I consider this protocol as a very important step to the normalization of relations between Turkey and Armenia and it will help Armenian economy which is in the slump due to the blockade situation…will be continued in episode #2

Jamil Islamov